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Volume XXIII JUNE, 1938 Number 4
PRICE CONTROL BY GOVERNMENT COMPETITION
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN FEDERATIONS
ALBERT SALISBURY ABELi
The stress of circumstance in the last few years has been
making us constitution-conscious. In considering remedies for
the evils with which we have been afflicted, we have not been
able to end our inquiry with a determination as to their desira-
bility or practicality but have been forced to proceed to an inde-
pendent examination of constitutionality. Despite this stimulus,
we have in our constitutional thinking retained a curious quality
of placid insularity. Some small part of the profession and the
public is probably aware of the fact that there exist in the world
other nations, continental in their size and common law in their
traditions and thought processes, which operate as federal sys-
tems under rigid constitutions. Almost no one has deigned to
glance at those nations for information or suggestions as to, how
the modern state can continue to live and thrive in a federal
form.
Australia and Canada have been perplexed, even as we have,
with the difficulties and distress of the war and post-war years.
Their problems have been much the same as ours;' the tempera-
ment, the ideals, and the political prejudices of their people are
much the same. Their constitutions differ from ours, it is true,
to some extent in expression and to a slighter extent in sub-
I Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University.
1. See the remarks of Lord Tweedsmuir, Governor General of Canada,
before the United States Senate, April 1, 1937: "I am especially interested
in Canada to discover that nearly all our problems are paralleled by yours.
We have the same economic problems. We have the same problems in the
drought areas in the West. We have very similar constitutional problems
and the task of harmonizing local interests and rights with national inter-
ests and duties." New York Herald-Tribune, April 2, 1937, p. 23:1.
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stance. The likeness and the differences are both of considerable
potential utility to all three countries. Through studying the
legislation of the others and its judicial fate in running the
constitutional gauntlet, the profession and the courts in each
may well discover possibilities and limitations of their own con-
stitution more clearly and comprehendingly than by a non-com-
parative method.
In this connection the words of Justice Barton of the High
Court of Australia will bear repeating:
I have endeavoured to come to my conclusions upon prin-
ciple, and I acknowledge that in the process I also am much
strengthened by the American authorities. When I hear
that too much attention is being paid to such decisions I
cannot help remembering that some of the most important
conclusions of this Court, defining and safeguarding the
Australian Constitution, were given upon citation of them,
and in memorable instances founded upon them. When I
travel in a railway carriage I often find a fellow occupant
who insists upon excluding the fresh air. Future instances
of such a dislike of ventilation will remind me strongly of
the warning against the breath of American reason.2
One familiar with the sometimes stuffy atmosphere of American
constitutional lore and-if it may be ventured of a neighbor-
its Canadian equivalent might wish this open window policy to
be extended.
In their general framework, American and Australian federal-
ism proceed on the same plan. In both, the federal government
has only such powers as are delegated to it by the Constitution
together with the incidental powers necessary and proper to
the exercise of the granted powers,3 while the state governments
2. Duncan v. Queensland (1916) 22 C. L. R. 556 at 602.
3. Constitution of the United States, Art. I, sec. 8: "The Congress shall
have power * * * 18. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any department or officer thereof."
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, sec. 51: "The Parlia-
ment shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the
peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to
* * * matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by this Con-
stitution in the Parliament or in either House thereof, or in the Government
of the Commonwealth, or in the Federal Judicature, or in any department
or office of the Commonwealth." Leading cases on the interpretation and
application of these provisions are McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 17 U. S.
316, 420, 4 L. ed. 579 and Jumbunna Coal Mine v. Victorian Miners' Asso-
ciation (1908) 6 C. L. R. 309, 14 Argus L. R. 701 at 713.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss4/1
1938] PRICE CONTROL BY GOVERNMENT COMPETITION 461
have reserved powers extending to all fields of governmental
action possessed by them before federation and not surrendered
at that time.4 Among the specific powers conferred on the fed-
eral government in both nations are those which have loosely
been labelled the "war power"' and the "commerce power," i.e.,
the power over interstate commerce." The Canadian constitution
is quite different in structure.7  Under it, certain powers are
specifically bestowed upon the Dominion government and others
upon the provincial governments. The latter possess only the
powers thus expressly conferred, while the Dominion possesses
whatever residual powers may exist, the specification not being
as to it the limit of its powers but merely a partial enumeration.8
4. Constitution of United States, Amendment X: "The powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, sec. 107: "Every
power of the Parliament of a Colony which has become or becomes a State
shall, unless it is by this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament
of the Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the-State, con-
tinue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission
or establishment of the State, as the case may be."
5. Constitution of the United States, Art. I, sec. 8: "The Congress shall
have power: * * * 11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal,
and make rules concerning captures on land and water; 12. To raise and
support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a
longer term than two years. 13. To provide and maintain a navy. 14. To
make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces."
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, sec. 51: "The Parlia-
ment shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the
peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:-
(VI) The naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the
several States, and the control of the forces to execute and maintain the
laws of the Commonwealth."
6. Constitution of the United States, Art. I, sec. 8: "The Congress shall
have the power: * * * 3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, sec. 51: "The Parlia-
ment shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the
peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:-
(1) Trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States."
7. Cf. the remarks of Lord Haldane, in Attorney-General for the Com-
monwealth v. Colonial Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. [1914] A. C. 237 at 252
et seq., contrasting the Canadian Constitution with those of the United
States and of Australia.
8. British North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Victoria ch. 3, sec. 91: "It
shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate and House of Commons, to make laws for the peace, order, and good
government of Canada, in relation to all matters not coming within the
classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of
the Provinces; and for greater certainty, but not so as to restrict the
generality of the foregoing terms of this section, it is hereby declared that"
the Dominion legislature shall have exclusive cognizance of named classes
of subjects.
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The actual grant to the Dominion is of the power to legislate
for the peace, order, and good government of Canada; but this
broad expression has been given such a confined construction
that it means greatly less than the language standing by itself
would indicate and, in operation, the Dominion, with its residual
powers, has little if any greater leeway for action than the
Union and the Commonwealth with their granted powers." To
the Dominion is given power over defense 0 and over "trade
and commerce,""' to the provinces power over "property and
civil rights" in the province.' 2 The line of cleavage between
these grants represents their respective regulatory realms.
One further important difference remains to be noted between
the Canadian constitutional scheme and that of the United States
and Australia. Under the former, the powers given are not sub-
ject to extraneous limitations imposed by other parts of the
instrument. If once action is found to be within the powers
allotted to province or Dominion, as the case may be, province
or Dominion may undertake it without further ado.23 Not so in
either the United States or Australia. In both of these the ques-
tion of constitutionality is only half-answered when the alloca-
tion of action between state and federal authority has been
effected. That is the first and in some respects the lesser of the
difficulties. In Australia it is required further that the regula-
tion attempted shall not so operate as to interfere with the
absolute freedom of interstate trade.' 4 In the United States it
must observe many taboos, the most potent of which is that it
9. See, on the general question of the respective power of the Dominion
and the Provinces, Montreal v. Montreal Street R. Co. [1912] A. C. 333,
1 D. L. R. 681; Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorneys-General for Al-
berta and British Columbia (1916) 26 D. L. R. 288.
10. British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria ch. 3, sec. 91 (7).
11. British North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Victoria ch. 3, sec. 91 (2).
The process of paring down the operative effect of this expression, so that
it now means little more than the "interstate commerce" spoken of by the
American Constitution was commenced by Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Parsons
(1881) App. Cas. 96, where the suggestion was made that the Dominion
power is to be confined to "general trade and commerce."
12. British North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Victoria ch. 3, sec. 92 (13).
13. See Nelson v. Pacific Great Eastern R. Co. (1918) 25 B. C. R. 259;
The King v. Royal Bank (1912) 4 Alta. L. R. 249; Sandwich E. v. Union
Nat. Gas Co. (1925) 57 Q. L. R. 656, 56 Q. L. R. 399.
14. "On the imposition of uniform duties of customs trade commerce and
intercourse among the States whether by means of internal carriage or
ocean navigation shall be absolutely free." Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act,-1900, 63-64 Vic. ch. 12, sec. 92.
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shall not infringe rights of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.13 The Australian limitation is necessarily pecu-
liar to a federal state and so presents a problem of federalism;
the American one could exist equally in a unitary government,
and an exploration of its intricacies and involutions has no
place in an inquiry focusing on the phenomena of federalism.
Accordingly, the subtle prohibitions imposed by the need for
"absolutely free" trade must be fully explored wherever they
arise while those arising from the need for "due process of
law" will call for no more than a casual glance.
Price control as it is ordinarily thought of and has commonly
been practised consists of a regime of governmental "thou shalt
not's.' ' 16 Prices, for instance, are too high. The seller, through
one circumstance or another, enjoys a position more favorable
than the pure theory of a competitive economy contemplates.
Thereupon government steps in with a command that he shall
not profit by his position to the full extent of his fortuitously
enhanced bargaining power but shall instead sell at a figure not
in excess of a stated price or a stated profit, assumed to be
reasonable. 17 Or, conversely, prices are so low as to threaten to
15. Constitution of the United States, Amendment V: "No person shall
* * * be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion"; Amendment XIV, 1. * * * "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." The classic statement of the assumptions
by which due process has been made a vehicle for invalidating price regu-
lation is that of Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1887) 165 U. S. 578, 589, 17 S. Ct.
427, 41 L. ed. 832: "The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not
only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of
his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right
of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to
use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or vocation, and
for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary,
and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes
above mentioned."
16. The article by Bonn on Price Regulation in 12 Encyclopedia of Social
Sciences (1934) 355-362, constitutes a useful brief survey of the history and
general techniques of price control.
17. This type of price regulation appeared very early in the history of
England, the American colonies, and Canada; see, e. g. the Statute of
Laborers (25 Edw. III) Stat. I (1350) (future prices of finished goods
fixed by reference to past prices) ; Acts Gen. Ass. Va. 1630, No. IV, 1
Henry's Stat. at L. 150 (resale of imported goods at any advance in price
prohibited); Acts of Nova Scotia, 1758 (32 Geo. II) ch. 21 (as size of
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throw the machinery of production out of order. Buyers, press-
ing to extremes their bargaining advantage over sellers (typi-
cally seller-producers), are only restrained by the government's
intervention, either to decree that minimum unit prices must be
paid for the commodity 8 or to establish marketing machinery
for draining off the surplus to a non-competitive market and so
restoring the bargaining equality between seller and buyer,
usually accompanied by some method of equalization between
sellers to make sure that all bear the loss and share the gain in
an approximately proportional degree.'9 These typical price con-
trol devices may be aptly characterized as control by command.
But there is another form of direct price control to which the
government may also resort which, by way of distinguishing it,
might be styled control by competition. Where control by com-
mand sets out to counteract competition, control by competition
sets out to revive and intensify it. Thus where the former, find-
ing a group of sellers in a semi-monopolistic position which en-
ables them to domineer over buyers and exact prices according
to their will, requires them under pains and penalties not to
demand as much as they please but to limit themselves to as
much as the government pleases, the latter sees the government
itself become a seller putting goods on the market in competition
with private dealers, who must thdn make terms as favorable
as this new competitor or resign themselves to keeping their
stocks on their hands. So, when the situation is reversed and
the distressed seller is at the mythical mercy of the buyer, con-
trol by command, prescribing the quantity of mercy which the
latter must show, compels him to refrain from taking advantage
of his opportunity beyond a certain point; while control by
competition finds the government itself becoming a buyer, ac-
bread). Its most notable use was during the World War when all three
of the federations here under consideration employed it extensively; see,
e. g. the War Precautions Act (Aust.) 1914-1916; the War Measures Act
(Canada) 1914; the Lever Act (1918) 40 Stat. 276.
18. As by the state milk control legislation, of which the New York
statute, Laws N. Y. 1933, ch. 158, Agriculture & Markets Law, Cons. Laws,
ch. 69, sustained in the Nebbia Case (1934) 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505,
78 L. ed. 940 is representative.
19. See the plans elaborated in the Dried Fruits Act 1928 (Aust.) No.
11 of 1928 in conjunction with such state legislation as the Dried Fruits
Acts 1924 and 1925 (S. A.) Nos. 1657, 1702; and in the Natural Products
Marketing Act, 1934 (Can.) c. 51 and the Natural Products Marketing Act
Amendment Act 1935 (Can.) c. 64.
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quiring stocks of the commodity at a price greater than that
which the competing private buyer has been offering, and so
compelling the latter either to offer equally favorable bids or
do without the commodity in question.
In both cases control by competition may be highly effective,
at least in certain situations and as to certain classes of goods.
The government with its enormous "capital" can practically
dominate the market if it chooses to bestir itself vigorously, out-
staying the private dealer on a purely business basis. Its in-
formational and investigating services enable it to keep abreast
of market tidings. The large scale institutions and establish-
ments which it maintains in its governmental capacity afford
outlets which enable it, when the parity between buyer and
seller has been restored, to lay aside its role of businessman and
resume its wonted duties as pure government, without having
tremendous stocks left over from its trading days to rot on its
hands. Opposed to all this there are certain political considera-
tions to be weighed. There is always the fear, for instance, that
the government may sustain a loss in its operations. More potent
perhaps, because more mystical, is the swelling cry that the
government is giving itself over to a regime of socialism.
2 0 It
is not these political limitations, however, but constitutional
restrictions on the government in the market place that here
concern us.
The federal form of government has seriously hamstrung price
control by command.2' It is potentially effective, although prob-
ably in a somewhat less degree, to hamper and halt price control
by competition. Here, as there, the requisite grant of power to
the federal government must be found or it may not venture to
20. This paper does not contemplate a discussion of the constitutionality
vel non of socialism as such, i. e. of a settled governmental regime of control
of the instrumentalities of production and distribution, but is limited to the
issues arising from occasional governmental interventions in the marketing
process for the purpose of price adjustment. On the other problem, see
Black, Socialism and the Constitution (1928) 28 Ill. L. Rev. 313.
21. The writer, who has traced the constitutional impaling on the federal-
state dilemma of legislation aimed at price control by command, in a paper
prepared under Professor Thomas Reed Powell at the Harvard Law School
last year, of which paper this article forms a part, knows of no published
discussion on the subject. For the last judicial pronouncements to date
involving the difficulties confronting that form of control, see Attorney
General for British Columbia v. Attorney General for Canada [1937] A. C.
377; James v. Commonwealth of Australia [1936] A. C. 578; Baldwin v.
G. A. F. Seelig, Inc. (1935) 294 U. S. 511, 55 S. Ct. 497, 79 L. ed. 1032.
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buy and sell for purposes of market manipulation. Here as there
the threat of interference with interstate dealers looms grimly
above the state or province when it undertakes to act, while
the privileges and immunities clause provides another obstacle
to be cleared.
The extent to which the federal-state type of governmental
organization affects the constitutionality of efforts at price con-
trol by government competition is the problem which it is here
proposed to examine. The paucity of cases bearing upon that
problem is at first blush astonishing. That astonishment van-
ishes however with an examination of the record. The plain
fact is that constitutional objections to such governmental action
have very seldom been urged because there has very seldom been
occasion to urge them.
The government has been more frequently and conspicuously
a buyer and/or seller in the United States than in either Canada
or Australia. Accordingly, the American experience will first
be examined, and then the more meagre materials from the two
younger federations.
When the states, or their creatures, the municipalities, have
gone into the business of selling in this country, they have al-
most always done so for other motives than to control the market
price of the ordinary goods of existence. While in general such
activity has been sustained, it has been undertaken under cir-
cumstances so special that it is almost rash to use the decisions
as a predicate for any general conclusions. At least that is so
of all of the decisions up until ten or fifteen years ago. Govern-
ment selling really has a bifurcated history in the United States.
One branch traces up through the sales of intoxicating liquors
and must be regarded with all the caution required in discussing
cases rooted in that interesting subject matter. The other has
a genealogy in municipal operation of "public utility" and public-
utility-like enterprises, which again makes it at once more and
less than it purports to be. Latterly there does seem to be some-
thing faintly glimpsable in the cases which indicates that the
law is shedding these peculiar marks of its origin, and the parts
are fusing into a true law of government as seller, although so
tentatively and hesitantly as to defy positive statement. The
most profitable approach would seem to be to study each of the
two branches in turn, and then the current state of affairs. Be-
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fore setting out on the quest, the caution is again given that the
cases will be found largely ignoring the federal-state issues latent
in them. Their silences are more significant than their state-
ments.
The middle of the nineteenth century witnessed a rash of
statutes vesting a monopoly of the sale of liquor in states or,
to speak more accurately, in local agents or subdivisions of the
states. In three states, Vermont, Connecticut, and Indiana, the
legislation was challenged on constitutional grounds. In the first
two it was declared valid,2 2 in the third the contrary result was
reached.23 It is only collaterally and because they are the first
of their breed that these early cases possess significance, for by
construction or express provision, each statute exempted from
its operation the liquor introduced from other states, and, at the
same time, it was intimated, '2 4 the domestic production of bever-
ages for extrastate tipplers was not prohibited. Furthermore,
the preoccupation of the courts was almost wholly with the pro-
hibitory features. In the cases from Vermont and Connecticut,
the merchandising sections, novel as they were, were well-nigh
neglected, receiving mention so elliptical as hardly to be worth
the name of discussion.2 5 The Indiana case did, indeed, denounce
feelingly the general impropriety of state operation of business,
but without categorizing the iniquity as violating any specific
constitutional provision.26 It was not on this ground, however,
22. Lincoln v. Smith (1855) 27 Vt. 328; State v. Brennan's Liquors
(1856) 25 Conn. 278.
23. Beebe v. State (1855) 6 Ind. 501.
24. Id. at 505.
25. The Vermont decision was concerned in large measure with the
question of the legality of the warrant under which liquor improperly pos-
sessed was seized, and was wholly devoid of discussion on the validity of
the dispensary system. The Connecticut case dismissed it with the follow-
ing statement: "It is finally said that the public have no right to monopolize
the sale of ardent spirits; the object of the legislature in authorizing a sale
by a public agent for certain purposes, was not to raise a revenue for the
town, but to accommodate certain persons with spirits for particular uses,
and at the same time to guard against the evils resulting from an indis-
criminate sale by all persons and for all purposes." State v. Brennan's
Liquors (1856) 25 Conn. 278, 288.
26. "And we may as well remark, here as anywhere, that if the manu-
facture and sale of these articles are proper to be carried on in the state
for any purpose, it is not competent for the government to take the business
from the people and monopolize it. The government can not turn druggist
and become the sole dealer in medicines in the state; and why? Because
the business was, at and before the organization of the government, and
is properly, at all times, a private pursuit of the people, as much so as
the manufacture and sale of brooms, tobacco, clothes, and the dealing in
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that the statute was held to be beyond the legislature's power
but because the prohibitory features were deemed to contravene
provisions of the state constitution construed as forbidding the
taking of liberty or property without due process. Whatever of
present interest the decision possesses is as a curious herald of
the injunctions of the Fourteenth Amendment thirteen years
before its enactment.
For over thirty years, the felicitous combination of purity
and profits embodied in the liquor dispensary system seems to
have sunk from public consciousness. Then it reappeared in
South Carolina, where in its different aspects it provoked a
series of decisions in various courts state and federal. The
statutory scheme was in all substantial respects the same as
those which had resulted three decades before in the conflicting
decisions already discussed. The supreme court of the state at
first27 held the statute bad in McCullough v. Browm,,28 but less
than a year afterwards it had a change of heart and in State
ex rel. George v. Aiken 29 overruled its former decision and be-
stowed the constitutional accolade upon the dispensary system.
The core of the dispute lay in the answer to the question,
Was the state liquor monopoly a police regulation? No, said the
court in the McCullough case, it was not a regulatory measure
nor a prohibitory law but simply a revenue act. Yes, it said in
the Aiken case, it was a true police regulation, dealing with a
commodity quite different from the ordinary goods of commerce.
tea, coffee and rice, and the raising of potatoes; and the government was
organized to protect the people in such pursuits from the depredations of
powerful and lawless individuals, the barons of the middle ages, whom
they were too weak to resist, single-handed, by force; and for the govern-
ment now to seize upon those pursuits is subversive of the very object for
which it was created and is inconsistent with the right of private property
in, and pursuits by the citizen. 'A government is guilty of an invasion upon
the faculties of industry possessed by individuals, when it appropriates to
itself a particular branch of industry, the business of exchange and broker-
age for example; or when it sells the exclusive privilege of conducting it.'
Say's Political Economy, note to p. 134." Beebe v. State (1855) 6 Ind. 501.
27. State ex rel. Hoover v. Chester (1893) 39 S. C. 307, 17 S. E. 752
was actually the first case to discuss the validity of the statute, and it was
sustained. The entire attack, however, was with reference to formalities
in enactment and expression, the court expressly refusing to rule on sub-
stantive constitutional issues under either the state or federal constitution,
on the ground that they were beyond the scope of the issues involved in
the appeal.
28. (1893) 41 S. C. 220, 19 S. E. 458, 23 L. R. A. 410.
29. (1894) 42 S. C. 222, 20 S. E. 221, 26 L. R. A. 345; followed in
Melchers v. Bates (1894) 42 S. C. 271, 20 S. E. 240.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss4/1
1938] PRICE CONTROL BY GOVERNMENT COMPETITION 469
There was substantial agreement that upon the police character
of the legislation and the extraordinariness of liquor as a sub-
ject the validity of the act must necessarily hinge. Because of
the denial of its police character, the statute was viewed by the
majority in the McCullough case as repugnant to the provisions
of the state constitution as being a deprivation of liberty and
property outside the realm of permitted governmental action.
This solution relieved the court of any need for passing on sup-
posed conflicts between the legislation and the Federal Constitu-
tion, or of determining whether anything in the state's position
as a member of a federal union interfered with its engaging in
the business of slaking the thirst of its citizens. It was no im-
pediment, however, to its speaking out a bold warning that such
action violated the fundamental tenets of free government on
which South Carolina's institutions were based (i. e., offended
the judicial motion of what the legislature ought to do).30 Be-
30. "Finally the constitutionality of the Dispensary Act is assailed, upon
the ground that the legislature have undertaken thereby to embark the
state in a trading enterprise, which they have no constitutional authority
to do, not because there is any express prohibition to that effect in the Con-
stitution, but because it is utterly at variance with the very idea of civil
government, the establishment of which was the expressly declared purpose
for which the people adopted their Constitution; and, therefore, all the
powers conferred by that instrument upon the various departments of the
government must necessarily be regarded as limited by that declared pur-
pose. Hence, when, by the first section of the second article of the Consti-
tution the legislative power was conferred upon the General Assembly, the
language there used cannot be construed as conferring upon the General
Assembly the unlimited power of legislating upon any subject, or for any
purpose according to its unrestricted will, but must be construed as limited
to such legislation as may be necessary or appropriate to the real and only
purpose for which the Constitution was adopted, to wit: the formation of a
civil government-upon the same principle it seems to us clear that any
act of the legislature which is designed to or has the effect of embarking
the state in any trade which involves the purchase and sale of any article
of commerce for profit, is outside and altogether beyond the legislative
power conferred upon the General Assembly by the Constitution, even
though there may be no express provision in the Constitution forbidding
such an exercise of legislative power. Trade is not and cannot properly
be regarded as one of the functions of government. On the contrary, its
function is to protect the citizen in the exercise of any lawful employment,
the right to which is guaranteed to the citizen by the terms of the Consti-
tution, and certainly has never been delegated to any department of the
government. We do not deem it necessary to go into any extended con-
sideration of the fearful consequences of recognizing the power of the
legislature to embark the state in any trade arising from the hazards of
all business of that character, or, to comment upon the danger to the people
of the monopoly of any trade by the state; for if it can monopolize one, it
may monopolize all other trades or employments, although it is permissible
for a court when called upon to construe an act, to consider its effect and
conseauences." McCullough v. Brown (1893) 41 S. C. 220, 248-250, 19 S. E.
458, 23 L. R. A. 410.
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cause-and solely because-of the affirmance of its police char-
acter, the dispensary system was viewed in the Aiken case as
conformable with the mandates of the state constitution. It
was franidy conceded that, except for that fact, indeed except
for the unusual nature of the commodity, the legislation could
not be sustained; as a derivative and incidental power corollary
to the police power, the state had ample authority to sell, but
there was no separate independent head of state power under
which it might do so.31 This analysis took the statute over the
due process and taxation hurdles but by that very fact imposed
on the court the need to inquire into its conformity with the
requirements of the Federal Constitution, which it had avoided
in the prior decision by finding the dispensary system to be
obnoxious to the Constitution of South Carolina. Aside from
the federal due process clause (which was disposed of by the
same reasoning as the analogous provision in the state constitu-
tion), it was urged in opposition to the validity of the fact that
two of the restraints on state action embodied in the United
States Constitution stood in the way of the legislation, namely,
the prohibition against abridging the privileges of immunities
of citizens of the United States and the erratic but compelling
veto of the commerce clause. The first of these contentions was
brushed lightly aside with the reiteration that here was an exer-
cise of the police power and consequently a matter not within
the range of that particular constitutional prohibition. As to
31. "It is because liquor is not regarded as one of the ordinary com-
modities that the act of 1892, prohibiting its sale, was, as to that matter,
construed to be constitutional. We cannot for a moment believe that the
court would have declared an act constitutional that prohibited entirely the
sale of corn, cotton, and other ordinary commodities. It is fallacious to
argue, in the light of this distinction, so thoroughly sustained by the authori-
ties, that if the government can take the exclusive control of the liquor
traffic, it can do so as to any other avocations in life * * *. If the act is
not a police measure, it is unconstitutional. It is quite a different thing,
however, when trade is simply an incident to a police regulation. Buying
and selling on the part of the federal, state, and municipal governments
take place every day and so long as the buying and selling are in pursu-
ance of police regulations, they are entirely free from legal objection. The
federal government sells liquor and other articles that have been seized
as contraband. Articles are purchased by the state to keep up the peni-
tentiary and asylums and other public institutions and enterprises. We
see it buying a farm to utilize the convict labor of the state, and selling
the produce made on the farm. Municipal governments have the right to
buy and dispose of property in administering their governmental affairs."
State ex rel. George v. Aiken (1894) 42 S. C. 222, 234, 247, 20 S. E. 221,
26 L. R. A. 345.
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the second, the court avoided any discussion in general terms
of the standing under tke commerce clause of a state sales sys-
tem, whether monopolistic or competitive. Instead it found
ready to hand the Wilson Act,3 2 bestowing upon the states a
large measure of autonomy in dealing with intoxicating liquors
moving from state to state and contented itself with the proposi-
tion that, under that act, control by the state of the liquor traffic
within its borders was not complicated by commerce clause con-
siderations, a principle as applicable, it was held, to a dispensary
system as to outright prohibition.
This later decision was in complete accord with the position
which the federal court had already taken on the South Carolina
legislation in Cantini v. TiUrnan.33 In that case the police power
had been invoked as furnishing the foundation of the legislation
and as getting it past objections grounded on the state constitu-
tion and the federal due process clause; and the Wilson Act had
been cited as a sufficient answer to the claim of interference with
interstate commerce. The charge that the legislation abridged
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States was
more fully rebutted than in the state decisions, on the reasoning
that the selling of liquor at retail did not rank as a privilege or
immunity of American citizenship. Furthermore certain other
contentions on federal constitutional grounds not urged before
the South Carolina court were disposed of favorably to the dis-
pensary act. Thus, the Wilson Act was found to furnish a suffi-
cient answer not only to the commerce clause contention but also
to the proposition that the South Carolina statute provided for
levying imposts or duties on imports or exports, contrary to the
provisions of Article 1, Section 10, of the Constitution. And the
fact that plaintiffs suing to enjoin enforcement of the statute
were Italian subjects was held not to disable the state from
establishing a liquor monopoly, despite the existence of a treaty
between the United States and Italy guaranteeing to citizens of
the latter the right "to carry on trade, wholesale and retail,"
"to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the
same terms as the natives," and "to enjoy the same rights and
privileges as are or shall be granted to the natives."
The decisions, placed as they were on the very narrow ground
32. (1890) 26 Stat. 313.
33. (C. C. S. C. 1893) 54 Fed. 969.
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of the application of the Wilson Act, were barren of informa-
tion on the point of the states' power to undertake the sale of
commodities generally without crossing the path of the com-
merce clause. The question, then, was whether the Supreme
Court in its turn would confine its discussion to the effect of the
Wilson Act or whether it would enter into the broader aspects
of the propriety or the status of state selling and state monopoly
under the Constitution. The result was ambiguous.
In two cases, Scott v. Donald4 and Vance v. W. A. Vander-
cook Co. No. 1,35 the Court condemned two successive and some-
what different dispensary acts. The latter of these cases held
that the Wilson Act was available to states electing to regulate
liquor by state monopoly, and so made that the law. Going
further it held that the preceding case had also held that; but
the language of the earlier opinion 3 and the division of the
court on the two cases 37 make it seem extremely doubtful whether
34. (1897) 165 U. S. 58, 17 S. Ct. 265, 41 L. ed. 632.
35. (1898) 170 U. S. 438, 18 S* Ct. 674, 42 L. ed. 1100.
36. It appears rather that what the earlier opinion had decided was that
the Wilson Act might be resorted to in aid of state prohibitory and probably
state licensing systems, but not in aid of a state dispensary system. See,
e. g., the following statements: "So long, however, as state legislation con-
tinues to recognize whiskies, beers and spiritous liquors as articles of lawful
consumption and commerce, so long must continue the duty of the Federal
courts to afford to such use and commerce the same measure of protection,
under the constitution and laws of the United States, as is given to other
artcles ** *'. It [the South Carolina Act] is not a law purporting to forbid
the importation, manufacture, sale and use of intoxicating liquors, as
articles detrimental to the welfare of the state and to the health of the
inhabitants, and hence it is not within the scope and operation of the act
of Congress of August, 1890." Scott v. Donald (1897) 165 U. S. 58, 91,
100, 17 S. Ct. 265, 41 L. ed. 632.
37. It is to be observed that Shiras, J., who wrote the majority opinion
in Scott v. Donald, wrote the dissent in Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co.
and affirmed emphatically in the latter that the former had held state dis-
pensary laws to be outside the protection of the Wilson Act, as against
the contention of the new majority that he meant no such thing. On the
other hand, Brown, J., who had dissented in Scott v. Donald because he
understood that it placed state liquor monopolies beyond the Wilson Act
pale, voted with the majority in Vance v. Vandercook. The majority in the
former case consisted of Fuller, C. J., and Field, Harlan, Gray, Shiras,
White, and Peckham, JJ.; Brown, J., dissented and Brewer, J., took no
part in the decision. In the latter case, the majority consisted of Harlan,
Gray, Brewer, Brown, White, and Peckham, JJ.; the dissent of Fuller, C. J.,
and Shiras and McKenna, JJ. Field, J., had been replaced by McKenna, J.
Of the six members who adopted the thesis that the cases were consistent
on the application of the Wilson Act, four had concurred in the former
opinion, one had dissented from it, and one had not participated; two of
the other justices constituting the original majority, including Shiras who
wrote the opinion, dissented in the second case, and one was dead. The
proposed reconciliation of the two is thus not very convincingly sustained
on a count of noses.
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the explanation of the earlier decision by the later one is much
more than a reconciliation a posteriori. That is largely imma-
terial, however, not only because, case law being ambulatory
in character, a later holding consigns to oblivion prior incon-
sistent decisions, but also because only insofar as the statutes
were considered outside the narrow and special limits of the
Wilson Act could their fate have any bearing on the general
problem of the state's right to deal in commodities. Whatever
significance the cases possessed on this broader problem lay in,
first, their development of commerce clause law independent of
the Wilson Act, and, secondly, the manifestations therein of
judicial receptivity or hostility toward the state's entrance into
the field of selling goods.
It was agreed by all the justices in both cases that the only
selling which might be monopolized by a state in any event was
selling within the state; hence, that attempts to strike at inter-
state sales by punishing residents who bought elsewhere, or by
seizing or preventing delivery of goods so purchased, constituted
conduct prohibited by the commerce clause. Upon that ground
the invalidity of the statute involved in the Vance case 38 was
rested. Again, should the state in setting up the monopoly ex-
pressly discriminate against producers in other states in favor
of those within its borders, that, it was felt, would render the
whole scheme obnoxious to the commerce clause. Preferential
clauses of this kind had characterized the dispensary act first
passed upon, in Scott v. Donald.39 Under that act the state was
directed to procure its supply from local brewers and distillers,
provided that the home-made product was as good and as cheap
as that available elsewhere, and to sell wine from South Caro-
lina grapes at not over ten per cent profit, with a view to en-
couraging viniculture within the state. These provisions were
eliminated by the later legislation; but the fact that they had
existed was eagerly resorted to in Vance v. Vandercook as a
ground for distinguishing Scott v. Donald.
The intrusion of government into a traditional domain of busi-
ness went almost unnoticed. There was an express refusal to
enter into that phase of the question in Scott v. Donald.40 In
38. (1898) 170 U. S. 438, 18 S. Ct. 674, 42 L. ed. 1100.
39. (1897) 165 U. S. 58, 17 S. Ct. 265, 41 L. ed. 632.
40. "It was pressed on us, in the argument, that it is not competent for
a state, in the exercise of its police power, to monopolize the traffic in
'intoxicating liquors', and thus put itself in competition with the citizens
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Vance v. Vandercook, it drew forth a perfunctory grumble in
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Shiras41 and a rather
summary dismissal by the majority of the ingenious contention
that all state trading inevitably involved discrimination, since
officials in obtaining supplies must needs purchase from citizens
of some of the states and in doing so necessarily preferred them
to citizens of other states. The explanation apparently is that
the court had swallowed the police regulation theory of the
dispensary system hook, line, and sinker. So completely was
their attention focused on that aspect of the legislation that
they had none left for the issues involved in state merchandising.
The Vance case voided a dispensary act and validated the
dispensary system. Thenceforth the constitutionality of the
scheme was never seriously assailed.42 When, in cases subse-
quently coming before the United States Supreme Court, state
of other states. This phase of the subject is novel and interesting, but we
do not think it necessary for us now to consider it." 165 U. S. at p. 101.
41. "We did not find it necessary in Scott v. Donald to pass upon the
validity of the scheme whereby a state should seek to establish itself as a
trader in articles of commerce, and to punish, as criminals, all persons who
should attempt to deal in such articles. Nor has the court seen fit to dis-
cuss that question in the present case. It may be that, if confined to articles
of state production, such a scheme might not be open to objections on
federal grounds. But, where a state proposes to create a monopoly in arti-
cles which its own legislation recognizes as proper subjects of manufacture,
sale and use, and where those articles are a part of international and inter-
state commerce, it is, I submit, too plain to call for argument that such
an attempt does not comport with that freedom of trade and commerce, to
preserve which is one of the most important purposes of our Federal Sys-
tem." (1898) 170 U. S. 438, 467, 468, 18 S. Ct. 674, 42 L. ed. 1100.
42. The Georgia Dispensary Statute, Ga. Acts of 1897, 562, was sus-
tained on reasoning practically identical to that of the South Carolina court.
Plumb v. Christie (1898) 103 Ga. 686, 30 S. E. 759, 42 L. R. A. 181. The
court sounded a refreshing note of judicial self-restraint in dealing with
legislation, saying at pp. 692, 693: "It is idle, in a court of law created
for the purposes of declaring legal principles or passing upon legal rights
of litigants at issue, to discuss 'inherent and inalienable rights,' supposed
to exist in the enlightened conscience or consciousness of mankind, yet
undefined by any rule known to the organic or statute laws of a state. In
discussing the validity of an act passed by the legislative branch of the
government, no light can be gathered by an attempt to show that it con-
travenes the general purposes for which a free government is established.
* * * It is worse than useless then for the courts to undertake to pass upon
the validity of a statute, by an inquiry as to whether or not is is just or
oppressive. To enter into such a field of investigation would be like em-
barking upon the sea without rudder or compass. A law is not necessarily
unconstitutional or otherwise invalid because it is unjust. We live under
a constitution and written laws, and the court can enforce only such rights
as they protect, and remedy such wrongs as they redress." The constitu-
tionality of the act was reaffirmed in Dispensary Commissioners v. Thorn-
ton (1898) 106 Ga. 106, 31 S. E. 733.
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liquor monopolies were involved, the court tacitly assumed the
constitutionality of the acts establishing them. But while those
cases thus added no increment of strength to the dispensary
system itself, they broadened the basis upon which it rested
and strengthened materially the implication that the states
might engage in selling other more prosaic commodities, less
steeped in emotion and politics than intoxicating liquors. Some-
thing must be allowed for the fact that the cases in question
thereafter were tax cases, in which the federal government
claimed to impose a tax on the conduct of state liquor dispen-
saries and the states sought to escape on the doctrine of the
immunity of governmental instrumentalities as established by
Collector v. Day" and the authorities following it. The disallow-
ance of the claimed immunity is therefore not conclusively con-
vincing that the assumptions of the decisions will be transferred
to controversies unrelated to the governmental hunger for
revenue which has left its mark on taxation law. On the other
hand, there is a fairly even chance that the change in language
represents a real change in attitude, however vague.
It will have been observed that the cases thus far discussed
all placed heavy stress upon the notion that the state dispensary
plan was an exercise of the police power. Whatever else there
might be in it was largely ignored. It was because it was an
appropriate measure of police regulation that it slid by the
multitude of constitutional bans and bars. That characteristic
was regarded as the key to its constitutionality. As long as that
element dominated the thinking of the courts in the field, the
dispensary cases were comparatively sterile of consequences in
other connections. The almost immemorial exertion of govern-
mental effort to regulate the liquor traffic has given it a peculiar
position as a head of the police power. Until the connection be-
tween the dispensary cases and the police power was broken
down, therefore, it was highly questionable how far, if at all,
those cases authorized government marketing of anything ex-
cept intoxicating liquors. It was the accomplishment of the tax
cases, about to be noticed, that they divorced the dispensary
laws from the police power and so made the constitutional dis-
cussions and suggestions relating to such laws available through-
out the wider field of state selling generally-perhaps.
43. (1871) 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 122.
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In South Carolina v. United States;4 the court conceded that
there was an element of police regulation in the statute; but it
refused to be blind to the other purposes which the act served
and notably to its efficiency as a revenue measure.4 5 To permit
the regulatory element to give color and character to the whole
system would be to falsify the facts. Whatever the conceptual
ancestry of the legislation, the actual going enterprise was ac-
tion of the state in a proprietary and not a governmental capac-
ity. It was running a business just as any private concern
might do; and the business, rather than the regulatory, feature
was predominant. Mr. Justice Brewer, who prepared the opin-
ion, even ventured a quick and cautious glance at the possibility
that the states might extend their-range of operations and under-
take to deal in a great variety of commodities, in which case, he
suggested, the character of their conduct would be precisely
analogous to that involved in operating the dispensary system. 46
After the rise and fall of national prohibition, several of the
states47 turned to the dispensary system and the stage was set
for a re-litigation of the issues decided by South Carolina v.
United States. In Ohio v. Helvering,4" the Supreme Court of
the United States re-affirmed its decision in the earlier case in
clear and positive terms. Nor was that all. Advancing one
mighty step beyond, the court declared that as to the operations
of its liquor business, the state was not exercising its police
power but was performing some other function no different than
that which would be involved in selling any other and ordinary
commodity. No constitutional objection was voiced to the fact
of its doing so; nor was there any indication of any such objec-
tion in case any state should decide to deal in other classes of
goods.4 9 Thus there was accomplished, so far as judicial rhetoric
44. (1905) 199 U. S. 438, 26 S. Ct. 110, 50 L. ed. 261.
45. In 1901, profits from sales amounting to $545,248.12 were divided
between the municipal and county and the state governments.
46. (1905) 199 U. S. 438, 454, 455, 26 S. Ct. 110, 50 L. ed. 261.
47. E. g., Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Iowa.
48. (1934) 292 U. S. 360, 54 S. Ct. 725, 78 L. ed. 1307.
49. "The argument seems to be that the police power is elastic and
capable of development and change to meet changing conditions. Never-
theless, the police power is and remains a governmental power and applied
to business activities is the power to regulate those activities, not to engage
in carrying them on. If a state chooses to go into the business of buying
and selling commodities, its right to do so may be conceded so far as the
Federal Constitution is concerned; but the exercise of the right is not the
performance of a governmental function, and must find its support in some
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could do so, the stripping of the dispensary system of its early
dependence on the police power. As a result, the liquor monopoly
decisions of the last century may well be generalized to apply
to the constitutionality of state sales without regard to subject
matter. They are distinguishable if the court feels that way;
but they are squarely in point, if it feels that way.
Concurrently in a widely separated field the practise of state
operation of economic enterprises and sale of commodities to its
citizens was growing. Many forms of activity had been captured
by the government so early in the history of the republic that
the entrepreneurs did not yet understand that the rights which
the union had been formed to secure, in which formation they
had themselves in many instances participated, were being un-
dermined. Thus we today are disposed to accept without hesita-
tion that education and the maintenance of highways are gov-
ernmental functions which must always and everywhere have
been so; yet the private schoolmaster and the tollroad proprietor
of late colonial and early federal days very probably thought
theirs were ordinary lawful callings and property interests not
greatly unlike those of the shopkeeper or the shipowner. The
free public school and the public highway were so early added
to the public services, however, that no protest was uttered
against the intrusion of the government into the competition for
scholars and travellers as subversive of the Constitution.50 As
time passed and the adoption of the Constitution receded further
and further into history, however, people became more and more
aware of what rights it was they had sought to protect by that
instrument. The shareholders in the Charles River Bridge seem
to have had a vague sense, as little as fifty years after the con-
vention, that the fundamental law was intended to guarantee
in perpetuity the rights of toll bridge proprietors51
Still the field of governmental activity in business kept ad-
vancing and the varieties of service afforded by it to its con-
stituents multiplying, until at the end of the nineteenth century
authority apart from the police power. When a state enters the market
place seeking customers, it divests itself of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto,
and takes on the character of a trader, so far, at least, as the taxing
power of the federal government is concerned." 292 U. S. at 389.
50. See 2 Taussig, Principles of Economics (2d ed. 1913) 484, 485;
Albritton v. Winona (Miss. 1938) 178 So. 799, 805.
51. See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837) 11 Pet. 420, 9
L. ed. 773.
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there was a rather considerable list of enterprises as to which
there was a well-established tradition of governmental operation
or subvention. Those of the categories which had been soonest
and most completely brought within the purview of government
action were by now regarded as governmental functions and
their one time status as competitive businesses was forgotten.
Those more recently and more sporadically undertaken by gov-
ernment were thought of as public service enterprises which
merged on the one side into matters purely governmental, on
the other into matters purely private.
How the state of Georgia became a railroad owner and the
city of New York a proprietor of ferry boats, how municipalities
throughout the land undertook to supply their citizens with
electricity and gas and water are not matters with which we
need presently concern ourselves in this inquiry into govern-
mental control of commodity prices. At the same time it must
be borne in mind that there is an ancestral link between govern-
mental supplying of services and governmental dealing in goods.
The classes of commodities which the government first under-
took to furnish its citizens were those which, to a degree, were
substitutional for, or whose production was normally incidental
to, the output of the public service enterprises. Indeed that still
continues to be the case. The government in the sales field is
much more the public utilitarian than the general merchant.
This close connection between public service enterprises and
the merchandising enterprises which have been undertaken has
assisted the courts tremendously in sustaining the validity of
legislation setting the government up in business, and they have
recurred again and again to their similarities to bolster up de-
cisions favorable to the constitutionality of such legislation.
Typically the business of selling goods has not been under-
taken by the states on a state wide basis but by agencies and
subdivisions of the state--counties, cities, and the like. It is,
accordingly, around the acts of these municipal bodies that the
constitutional law in the field has accreted. That accidental cir-
cumstance is probably of little importance, however, no distinc-
tion being maintainable on federal constitutional grounds be-
tween what the state does by itself and what it does through
these subordinates.
The pioneer effort in the direction of giving municipal bodies
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss4/1
1938J PRICE CONTROL BY GOVERNMENT COMPETITION 479
power to enter into the field of selling commodities seems to
have been the Massachusetts proposal in 1892 to confer upon
the cities and towns of the state the right to maintain fuel
yards to sell coal and wood to the inhabitants. Although the
grain vending activities of the city of Boston throughout the
eighteenth century furnished a historic analogy for the legisla-
tion, 52 the prevailing cast of legal and economic thought in the
late nineteenth century was not congenial to such attempts.
The Supreme Judicial Court advised against the constitutional-
ity of the projected legislation, 53 reiterating the rebuke a few
years later when the question was again raised.54 Shortly
Michigan announced its concurrence.55 The early record of state
merchandising, as embodied in the municipal fuel yard acts,
was thus through the first decade of the present century an
unbroken succession of judicial defeats.
52. "In the fall of 1713 there was a scarcity of grain, and the General
Court prohibited the exportation of it. 1 Prov. Laws (state ed.) 724. The
town of Boston in March, 1713-14, voted to lay in a stock of grain to the
amount of five thousand bushels of corn and to store it in some convenient
place and it was left to the selectmen to dispose of it as they saw fit.
Record Commissioner's Reports, 101, 104. After that, as shown by the
records, the town regularly bought and stored grain and sold it to the
inhabitants as late as 1775, and perhaps later, and it established two gran-
aries, one of which, in the common, remained in use probably as long as
the town bought and sold grain. Whether after the Revolution the town
continued to buy grain, we are not informed, as the records have not been
printed. The amount which could be sold to any one person was often
limited to a few bushels at a time. The report of a committee in 1774
shows that from March, 1769, to March, 1774, the quantity of corn and
rye purchased was five thousand eight hundred and thirty-six bushels and
that the stock on hand was three hundred seventy-six bushels. It is ap-
parent that the original purpose was to provide against a famine, and that
it was not the intention of the town to assume the business of buying and
selling all the grain which the inhabitants needed, but of keeping such an
amount in stdre as was necessary in order that small quantities might be
obtained, particularly by the poorer inhabitants, at what the selectmen, or
a committee of the town, or the town itself deemed reasonable prices. On
May 25, 1795, the town voted to sell the granary." Opinion of the Justices
(1892) 155 Mass. 598, 602, 603, 30 N. E. 1142.
53. Opinion of the Justices, supra, note 52. Holmes, J., dissented, and
Barker, J., entered a qualified dissent.
54. Opinion of the Justices (1903) 182 Mass. 605, 66 N. E. 25.
55. Baker v. Grand Rapids (1906) 142 Mich. 687, 106 N. W. 208. The
court only adhered to the Massachusetts doctrine to the extent of declaring
that the town could not embark on sales of coal as a commercial enter-
prise, although it might do so to tide over emergencies. The case is of
doubtful weight, as, first, the municipality did not deny but indeed ex-
pressly admitted its inability to sell coal on a general commercial basis and,
second, the plaintiff's application for injunction was dismissed on the clean
hands doctrine and for failure to show injury.
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In the next ten years, judicial sentiment on the constitution-
ality of state selling was evenly divided.56 While Louisiana in
191457 and Missouri in 191958 held that municipalities might not
constitutionally engage in the manufacture and sale of ice, a
contrary result was reached in Georgia ;5' and the municipal fuel
yards of Portland were given a clean bill of constitutional
health by the Supreme Court of Maine 0 and, on appeal, of the
United States.0 1 Furthermore in the war and post-war years
toward the end of the decade, the scarcity, actual or potential,
of many essential commodities and unsettled market conditions
led to the adoption of statutes in a number of states62 and of a
constitutional amendment in Massachusettsr3 looking to the dis-
tribution of large classes of consumers' goods by the govern-
ment, typically by municipal action.
From 1920 to the present date, case after case has sustained
the constitutionality of such or similar municipal undertakings
and in not a single jurisdiction not already committed to the
opposite rule64 has it been adopted. Municipal ice plants were
56. For a summary of doctrines and prospects as they appeared toward
the end of this period, see Maxey, Is Government Merchandising Constitu-
tional? (1918) 52 Am. L. Rev. 215.
57. Union Ice & Coal Co. v. Ruston (1914) 135 La. 898, 66 So. 262.
58. State ex rel. Kansas City v. Orear (1919) 277 Mo. 303, 210 S. W.
392.
59. Holton v. Camilla (1910) 134 Ga. 560, 68 S. E. 472; Saunders v.
Arlington (1918) 147 Ga. 581, 94 S. E. 1022. The latter case relied, for
the constitutional point, on the earlier one, without further discussion.
60. Laughlin v. Portland (1914) 111 Me. 486, 90 Atl. 318; Jones v. Port-
land (1915) 113 Me. 123, 93 Atl. 41.
61. Jones v. Portland (1917) 245 U. S. 217, 38 S. Ct. 112, 62 L. ed. 252.
62. Conn. Pub. Acts 1917, ch. 386, see. 2, p. 2554 (municipal sales of
food or fuel supplies); N. J. Laws 1917, ch. 80, and N. J. Laws 1918, ch. 53
(municipal sales of food or fuel, statutes of limited duration) ; N. Y. Laws
1917, ch. 813, sec. 14 (municipal sales of food and fuel on assent of state
officials); Vt. Pub. Acts 1919, no. 105, p. 110 (municipal sales of fuel and
ice) ; Wis. Laws 1917, ch. 561 (state expropriation and sale of fuel, food,
seeds, or other personal property necessary for common defense).
63. Const. Mass., Art. XLVII: "The maintenance and distribution at
reasonable rates, during time of war, public exigency, emergency or dis-
tress of a sufficient supply of food and other common necessaries of life
and the providing of shelter are public functions and the commonwealth
and the cities and towns therein may take and may provide the same for
their inhabitants in such manner as the general court may provide." Rati-
field Nov. 6, 1917. Mass. Gen. Acts 1918, ch. 204, carried into operation the
terms of the provision.
64. Solely upon the authority of Baker v. Grand Rapids, supra, note 55,
the Michigan court held, in Toebe v. Munising (1937) 282 Mich. 1, 275
N. W. 744, that municipalities had no authority to engage in the fuel busi-
ness, two justices dissenting.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss4/1
19383 PRICE CONTROL BY GOVERNMENT COMPETITION 481
approved in Arizona in 19265 and in Texas in 1930.6 In Minne-
sota 6 7 and Nebraska"8 the operation of city fuel yards was held
constitutional. The principle of government selling was ex-
tended in the last named state to retail sales of gasoline, with
the cities authorized to operate filling stations; and neither
state"9 nor federal"0 courts found any meritorious ground of
constitutional objection to the system.
The completeness with which the courts have reversed their
attitude toward municipal operation of retail sales establish-
ments would seem to be, for one of even mildly prophetic gifts,
pregnant with the materials of prediction. Be that as it may,
the mere fact that up to 1910 such enterprises were held un-
constitutional in a hundred per cent of the cases, that from 1910
to 1920 there was an exactly even division among the jurisdic-
tions passing on the question, and that since 1920 the authorities
have unanimously sustained such undertakings, except for one
decision attributable to the compulsion of stare deeisis,71 makes
the present trend and direction of judicial sentiment on the
subject amply transparent.
In all this array of cases one seeks in vain for any reasoned
discussion of the effect of the federal system upon the limita-
tions and capacities of the several states. It simply is not there.
Yet the cases are not without their value in that connection.
For one thing, the practice of conducting retail sales establish-
ments has grown from a status of general outlawry to one of
general acceptance, so that as, if, and when the constitutionality
of the practice shall in the future be contested on strictly federal
grounds, the attack will be on a familiar form of governmental
action which will have in its favor all the psychological reluc-
tance of judicial bodies to uproot the established. There will
be full scope for the technique of rationalizing inertia which
has on occasion played such a signal part in the disposition of
constitutional issues. Moreover, the very fact that there has
65. Tombstone v. Macia (1926) 30 Ariz. 218, 245 Pac. 677.
66. Denton v. Denton Home Ice Co. (1930) 119 Tex. 193, 27 S. W. (2d)
119.
67. Central Lumber Co. v. Waseca (1922) 152 Minn. 201, 188 N. W. 275.
68. Consumers Coal Co. v. Lincoln (1922) 109 Neb. 51, 189 N. W. 643.
69. Standard Ol Co. v. Lincoln (1926) 114 Neb. 243, 207 N. W. 172.
70. Mutual Oil Co. v. Zehrung (D. C. D. Neb., Lincoln Div., 1925) 11
F. (2d) 887.
71. Supra, note 64.
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been, and still is, so little consideration of the state-federal
problem possesses its own significance as an indication that the
profession has felt that the frame of government presents no
very serious obstacle to the adoption of state merchandising
schemes.
The great bulk of the discussion has stressed the feature of
the expense involved in inaugurating such schemes, to the al-
most complete neglect of consideration of the effect and legality
of competitive selling as such. Thus the turning point in prac-
tically all the cases reviewed has been the issue of whether the
taxes involved in setting up the sales enterprises in question
were for a public purpose.7 2
The courts which have sustained the validity of municipal
merchandising have made frequent reference to the special con-
ditions prevailing at the time and place to aid them in finding
a public purpose to be served by the operation of the business.73
Again, emergency has been mentioned on several occasions as a
factor of great weight in support of municipal action. How
much actual importance it has may well be questioned, however.
Upon that point the Portland Fuel Yard Cases, in the first of
which74 the emergency element was much stressed while in the
second 75 a permanent fuel yard ordinance was sustained with-
out discussion, solely upon the authority of the prior case, are
suggestive. Reference to such factors has in any event proved
a convenient formula with which to solve the problem of public
purpose and the broader problem of which it is a specialized
form, that of due process. By its use the courts have found
themselves able to reconcile such municipal undertakings with
72. See Note (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 775 for a discussion of doctrinal
evolution regarding state and municipal excursions into business enterprise
as public purposes under the taxing power.
73. See Tombstone v. Macia (1926) 30 Ariz. 218, 235, 245 Pac. 667;
Standard Oil Co. v. Lincoln (1926) 114 Neb. 243, 251, 207 N. W. 172; Holton
v. Camilla (1910) 134 Ga. 560, 567, 68 S. E. 472. The contrary view has
been supported by the holding that the tables of public purpose were closed
at a date now past and cannot be reopened; see, e. g., the statement in
State ex rel. Kansas City v. Orear (1919) 277 Mo. 303, 320, 210 S. W.
392: "The rule to be invoked in determining whether the business in ques-
tion, when it is proposed by the municipality to engage in the sale of the
enumerated necessities of life, is public or private, is whether such business
is sanctioned by time and the acquiescence of the people as being public
or private."
74. Laughlin v. Portland (1914) 111 Me. 486, 90 Atl. 318.
75. Jones v. Portland (1915) 113 Me. 123, 93 Atl. 41; aff'd (1917) 245
U. S. 217, 38 S. Ct. 112, 62 L. ed. 252.
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the imperatives of the state constitutions and also to find them
compatible with the Fourteenth Amendment."
It is probably the due process provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment that a few courts have had in mind in making the
blanket statement that governmental operation of such busi-
nesses as those under consideration does not violate any prin-
ciple of the Federal Constitution.- In general no attempt has
been made to spell out any other ground of repugnance to that
instrument. There seems to be no instance in which the com-
merce clause has been urged against the carrying on of retail
businesses by municipalities. On one occasion the claim was
advanced that such action was an impairment of privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; but it was made
with seemingly faint conviction and disallowed with scant dis-
cussion.78 By and large any limitations on such matters which
may inhere in the federal structure of the republic have been
permitted to lie unasserted, except for the summarily rejected
claim of infringement of privileges and immunities.
Only rarely have the businesses been frankly and avowedly
competitive in character. In the special circumstances of the
fuel and ice businesses, judicial caution found convenient es-
capes from an indorsement of competitive government selling.
Public health and safety, connection with existing municipal
services, analogy to public service enterprises-in these were
found the justification and the limits of municipal merchandis-
ing. While the decisions which refused to sustain such municipal
76. "The due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, although the amendment does not mention taxes, in-
hibits their imposition for private purposes. The principle is fundamental
in government that the power of taxation, though unrestrained in terms,
cannot be exercised for other than a public purpose.* * * Economic and
industrial conditions are not stable, times change. Many municipal activi-
ties, the propriety of which is not now questioned, were at one time thought,
and rightly enough so, of a private character. The constitutional provision
that taxes can be levied only for public purposes remains; but conditions
which go to make a purpose public change." Central Lumber Co. v. Waseca(1922) 152 Minn. 201, 202, 188 N. W. 275. See Mutual Oil Co. v. Zehrung(D. C. D. Neb., Lincoln Div., 1925) 11 F. (2d) 887. In Jones v. Portland,
supra, note 75, the discussion of constitutionality under the Federal Con-
stitution was confined in both the Maine and the United States Supreme
Courts to the due process issue.
77. See Denton v. Denton Home Ice Co. (1930) 119 Tex. 193, 203, 27
S. W. (2d) 119; Standard Oil Co. v. Lincoln (1926) 114 Neb. 243, 253, 207
N. W. 172.
78. See Holton v. Camilla (1910) 134 Ga. 560, 68 S. E. 472.
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activity went out of their way to condemn governmental selling
and to assimilate the selling of ice and fuel with other retail
enterprises,79 those which upheld the legislation were for the
most part active in distinguishing them and ready to cry con-
fusion to the general policy, without condemning the particular
instance.8"
The use as a whipping boy of general competitive selling by
government was not possible in the Lincoln Filling Station
Cases. The Standard Oil Company alleged the absence of emer-
gency or combination in restraint of trade and the purpose of
the city to maintain one station only, with the object of con-
79. The police power "is a power to regulate the business of others, and
not a power to go into business. Of course, if the business cannot be regu-
lated otherwise than by the government going into it, or perhaps even if,
in the opinion of the Legislature, that mode of regulation is the most prac-
tical and best, such mode can be adopted; but nothing of that kind could
be pretended in the case of the grain or the ice business.* * * For the sup-
port of its paupers and indigent sick the municipality may go as deeply
as the necessity of the case may require into the pockets of its large tax-
payers; but it cannot do so for the purpose of selling ice, or bread, or
meat, or drugs, etc., more cheaply to the inhabitants in general than the
regular merchants are doing. This would be paternalism pure and simple,
a thing foreign to our system of government." Union Ice & Coal Co. v.
Ruston (1914) 135 La. 898, 919, 926, 66 So. 262. "A municipality, how-
ever, cannot enter into a commercial enterprise, such as buying and selling
coal to its citizens as a business, thereby entering into competition with
dealers in coal." Baker v. Grand Rapids (1906) 142 Mich. 687, 106 N. W.
208. "We know of nothing in the history of the adoption of the Consti-
tution that gives any countenance to the theory that the buying and selling
of such articles as wood and coal for the use of the inhabitants was re-
garded at that time as one of the ordinary functions of the government
which was to be established. There are nowhere in the Constitution any
provisions which tend to show that the government was established for the
purpose of carrying on the buying and selling of such merchandise as at
the time when the Constitution was adopted was usually bought and sold
by individuals, and with which individuals were able to supply the com-
munity, no matter how essential the business might be to the welfare of
the inhabitants. The object of the Constitution was to protect individuals
in their right to carry on the customary business of life, rather than to
authorize the Commonwealth or the 'towns, parishes, precincts, and other
bodies politic' to undertake what had usually been left to the private enter-
prise of individuals." Opinion of the Justices (1892) 155 Mass. 598, 602,
603, 30 N. E. 1142.
80. "That it is beyond the power of a municipal corporation to engage
in the sale of commodities which are and can be easily conducted by private
business concerns in competition with one another, and which can be suffi-
ciently regulated thereby. * * * In this we most heartily concur." Laughlin
v. Portland (1917) 245 U. S. 217, 499, 38 S. Ct. 112, 62 L. ed. 252. In
Holton v. Camilla (1910) 134 Ga. 560, 563, 68 S. E. 472 the city expressly
disclaimed any intention of embarking on an independent ice business and
urged only its right to use facilities in connection with existing waterworks
and electric light plant for the production of ice.
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trolling the market price at which gasoline was to be sold locally.
The city demurred. The court was thus squarely confronted
with the propriety of municipal operation designed to establish
a retail selling price for a commodity. Over the bitter protests
of two justices, it was held that notwithstanding the admittedly
competitive character of the undertaking, it was still within the
sphere of the permissible.8 1 On a closely similar state of plead-
ings, the Federal District Court for Nebraska had already sus-
tained the activities of the municipality, 2 noting the fact that,
while there had been much talk in the opinions about a supposed
inability of government to enter business in competition with
private dealers, the Supreme Court of the United States in
Jones v. Portland83 had not indicated its assent to any such dis-
tinction. Both the state and the federal court did indeed stress
the great and growing importance of gasoline as an article of
commerce and consumption; but the very fact that they did so,
while rejecting the proposed test on the ground of competitive
purpose, seems to justify an inference that whatever limit there
may be on the government's power is to be found in the im-
portance of the commodity and not in any element of com-
petition with private business. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the state decision without opinion,8 4 on the au-
thority of Jones v. Portland.
The relative infrequency with which the states have under-
taken the direct operation of retail sales enterprises is the ob-
vious explanation of the fragmentary character of the law in
that connection as compared with the materials on municipal
merchandising. The two Dakotas seem to have provided the
only instances where such a policy has been submitted to the
scrutiny of the courts. In South Dakota, the state embarked
on a program of gasoline distribution similar in general char-
acter to that which had been put into effect in the city of Lincoln,
Nebraska, and sustained in the cases already noticed.8  Such
activity was distasteful to the supreme court of the state which
81. Standard Oil Co. v. Lincoln (1926) 114 Neb. 243, 207 N. W. 172.
82. Mutual Oil Co. v. Zehrung (D. C. D. Neb., Lincoln Div., 1925) 11
F. (2d) 887.
83. (1917) 245 U. S. 217, 38 S. Ct. 112, 62 L. ed. 252.
84. (1927) 275 U. S. 504, 48 S. Ct. 155, 72 L. ed. 395.
85. Standard Oil Co. v. Lincoln (1926) 114 Neb. 243, 207 N. W. 172;
(1927) 275 U. S. 504, 48 S. Ct. 155, 72 L. ed. 395; Mutual Oil Co. v.
Zehrung (D. C. D. Neb., Lincoln Div., 1925) 11 F. (2d) 887.
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held the scheme bad, not because of substantive unconstitution-
ality but by reason of a defect in the title of the act under which
the governor assumed to act in setting aside the requisite funds
to start the system going 06 The circumspection of the court
with respect to the ground of decision was not matched by a
pararallel restraint in the language employed. Noting, without
determining, the contention that the section was authorized as
an exercise of the police power, the court strongly reprobated
the state's entry into the field of private business, declaring the
retail selling of any commodity, however important to the con-
suming public, not to be among the public purposes for which
taxation was authorized. 7 In thus aligning itself in sentiment,
though not technically in decision, with a school of thought al-
ready obsolescent in the nearly related field of municipal mer-
chandising,88 the court disregarded utterly the judicial approval
bestowed upon the commercial grain operations of the state's
northern twin.
While, it was as a buying, more than a selling, threat that
wheat-raising North Dakota wished to throw its weight into
the market, under the program formulated and carried to en-
actment by the Non-Partisan League in 1919, and in that aspect
its action must be considered more at length later, yet it should
be noted that the endorsement given to the program by the de-
cision in the case of Green v. F'azier, in both the state and
86. White Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v. Gunderson (1925) 48 S. D. 608,
205 N. W. 614; Comment (1926) 21 Ill. L. Rev. 178.
87. "There is nothing essentially different in the business of retailing
gasoline from that of any other commodity, and while it may be conceded
that gasoline under present economic conditions is a necessity, there is no
reason why it may not be retailed by private enterprise. There is no need
of the exercise of the right of eminent domain; it is not contraband as is
intoxicating liquor, and no governmental restrictions are placed upon trade
in gasoline, as such. Private persons have as much right to engage in the
sale of this commodity as in the sale of any other useful or necessary
article. We are satisfied the state may not enter into business of selling
gasoline and levy and collect taxes to conduct such business, unless, as
suggested by the defendants, article 13 of our Constitution, and especially
section 1 of said article, empowers the state to enter into such business.
Recent amendments to our Constitution evidence a tendency to depart from
the earlier fundamentals of our government, and experiment in socialism
and paternalism. * * * There is nothing in any of these amendments to the
Constitution which can be construed to apply to the sale of gasoline by
the state. * * * If we were to so hold it would lead to a practical removal
of all restrictions upon the state to engage in business, since there is
nothing which is not useful and used in activities developing the resources
of the state." 48 S. D. at 621, 622.
88. See the discussion, supra p. 481.
89. (1920) 44 N. D. 395, 176 N. W. 11.
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the federal 0 supreme courts, extended without qualification to
both phases of the state's undertaking. In spirit, the White
Eagle Oil case,91 with its mutterings against the constitutionality
of the state conduct of business enterprises, however closely
linked to the economic welfare of the state, is antagonistic to
the approval given to comparable activities in North Dakota,
by the United States Supreme Court.
Can anything be safely ventured in the light of the situations
and cases which have been reviewed as to the constitutionality
of price control by competition in selling, as a function of the
states in the United States? Not very confidently, perhaps, yet
they do, it is submitted, give something with which to work.
Probably the circumstantial difference between direct state sell-
ing and municipal selling can be regarded as of no importance;
at any rate no point is made of that factual distinction either
in the dispensary cases, in the White Eagle Oil case, or in Green
v. Frazier, all of which freely accept the municipal merchandis-
ing cases as at least persuasive authority without suggesting
any corresponding distinction in result. The challenge of the
due process requirement and of the public purpose test in taxa-
tion both seem to have been met though the courts have been
inclined to timidity in formulating the rationale for that result,
clinging closely to the familiar formulae and concepts, such as
the police power, and thundering against the constitutionality
of government competition in the abstract while sustaining its
various concrete manifestations. But the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in South Carolina v. United States92 and
in Ohio v. Helvering,93 looking through the spurious regulatory
purpose of the dispensary acts to their revenue features and
withdrawing the police power scaffolding of the system without
questioning its proper validity, and in Standard Oil Co. v. Lin-
eoln,9 4 affirming a frankly competitive municipal enterprise un-
dertaken for the acknowledged purpose of controlling prices,
make it, if not certain, at any rate more than probable, that
there is nothing in the due process concept which interdicts the
control of prices by competition. With the due process issue out
90. (1920) 253 U. S. 233, 40 S. Ct. 499, 64 L. ed. 878.
91. Supra, note 86.
92. (1905) 199 U. S. 438, 26 S. Ct. 110, 50 L. ed. 261.
93. (1934) 292 U. S. 360, 54 S. Ct. 725, 78 L. ed. 1307.
94. (1927) 275 U. S. 504, 48 S. Ct. 155, 72 L. ed. 395.
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of the way, the constitutional problem is stripped down to the
naked question of the effect on state power of the federal tie.
One or two cases holding that state sales systems do not impair
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States9 5
a handful of decisions disposing of commerce clause objections
to the dispensary system under the Wilson Act, random holdings
that state monopolies must not discriminate against extrastate
dealers or concerns by a grant of preferential treatment to the
home team-such is the meagre sum total of available material
to answer that question. On the privileges and immunities point
there is indeed something that looks like ossified law. On the
commerce clause phase, we have only cases dealing with a sys-
tem of monopoly control, and treating even that largely on the
basis of a special statute. The embryo of doctrine in that field
is not yet viable. On the other hand, the more ominous perils of
due process, so often fatal to judicially unloved economic and
social legislation, has become more of a past threat than a pres-
ent danger.
The United States Supreme Court has approved the practise
of retail selling with the undisguised object of price manipula-
tion, and has stressed the remoteness of its connection with the
police power without imputing to it any the less validity on
that account. Most important-probably the important thing-
is the fact that the system has been increasing and multiplying,
spreading over such diverse fields as whisky, ice, coal, gasoline,
and wheat. The public and the courts are getting used to seeing
it around. Most victims on the altar of constitutionality are
sacrificed in their tender infancy, not after they have reached
their tough and hardened adulthood. When the attack on such
a program comes, as in all probability it will, there will be very
little in the existing judicial materials to fend it off. What it
will have to do is to overthrow a cumulation of instances of
actually existing exercises of such power by the state and by
municipalities. The tremendous inertia of institutions makes it
better than an even bet that, whatever the sanctioning formula,
the states' control of sellers' prices by competition will be found
entirely compatible with their position as members of the union.
95. Holton v. Camilla (1910) 134 Ga. 560, 68 S. E. 472; Cantini v. Till-
man (C. C. S. C. 1893) 54 Fed. 969; State v. Aiken (1894) 42 S. C. 222,
20 S. E. 221, 26 L. R. A. 345.
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In Canada the provincial governments have engaged in the
retail selling of goods to any considerable extent in only one
field, that of intoxicating liquors. While the dispensary system
has been adopted by the legislatures of several of the provinces,
either on a monopolistic basis- or supplemented to a certain
extent by private licensed dealers,9 7 there has been very little
litigation contesting the authority of the provinces so to act.
The absence from the British North America Act of a due
process clause would seem to be the major factor which has
produced this paucity of precedent. In only one98 case, indeed,
has provincial authority in this regard been called in question;
but that one is particularly enlightening for our purposes since
it was fought out on the issue of the distribution of power be-
tween the provinces and the Dominion.
British Columbia had adopted a policy of provincial monopoly
in the selling of intoxicating liquors in 192199 in lieu of its prior
prohibition act; and, a prosecution having been instituted against
a private person for making sales in violation of the act, its
validity was sustained by the supreme court of the province in
Re Army and Navy Veterans of Canada.200 The settled technique
of construction applied to the British North America Act re-
quired the finding, first, that there was an established head of
provincial power in section 92 on which the legislation might
be rested and, secondly, that there was no power given the
Dominion by section 91 to which it might more appropriately
be assigned.',, The court, while not unaware of the regulatory
features incident to the bill, as was shown by its discussion of
96. See, e. g., the Liquor Control Act (Ont.), Ont. Rev. St. (1927) ch. 257.
97. As under the Alcoholic Liquor Act (Que.), Que. Stat. 1921 (11 Geo.
V.) ch. 24.
98. In Quebec Liquor Commission v. Lessard (1922) 63 D. L. R. 177,
37 Can. C. C. 112, the Quebec statute, supra, note 97 was sustained as a
proper exercise of provincial power; but the opinion, which is brief, does
not indicate that the dispensary feature of the act was involved and, in-
deed, the facts on which the prosecution was based tend to negative any
such supposition and to suggest that the attack on the act proceeded on a
wholly different basis.
99. By the Government Liquor Act, 1921 (B. C.), B. C. Stat. ch. 30.
100. (1921) 61 D. L. R. 416. Also see Rex. v. Ferguson (1922) 69 D. L.
R. 153, reaffirming the constitutionality of the act and holding that due
proclamation thereof, under sec. 117 of the statute had been made, so as
to bring it into effect.
101. This technique for the determination of the validity of provincial
legislation is most explicitly stated, and most fully developed, in Lord
Haldane's opinion in Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider [1925] A. C.
396, [1925] 2 D. L. R. 5.
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the prior British Columbia liquor legislation and of cases con-
cerning the liquor systems in the other provinces, did not torture
the law into a mere regulatory measure or rule of police, but
treated it without equivocation as a provincial incursion into
the domain of business. Against such an enterprise it was urged
that the legislation was a dealing with "trade and commerce,"
a subject entrusted to the Dominion by section 91 (2) ; in its
favor, that it concerned either a local work or undertaking, or
"property and civil rights within the province," or a matter "of
a merely local or private nature in the province," which were
subjects of provincial cognizance under subsections 10, 13, and
16 respectively of section 92. The suggestion that the liquor
stores of British Columbia were a local work or undertaking was
rejected by the court, which confined the application of the
clause to structures and plants of a physical and tangible char-
acter, such as electric plants. But the other two heads of provin-
cial power considered, and more especially subsection 16, were
felt to be sufficiently comprehensive for the liquor business to be
intra vires the province. The opposing claim that the power
related to trade and commerce was grounded on the contention
that liquor was a commodity of commerce, so recognized by
British Columbia, and consequently any attempt by it to take
into its hands the supplying of that commodity was an invasion
of Dominion powers; but the court found no difficulty in dis-
missing the contention as an attempt to assign to provincial
action a limit inconsistent with its recognized extent.1 02
Thus, in Canada as in the United States, the present case
authority, what there is of it, recognizes the right of the con-
stituent members of the federation to embark on sales enter-
prises. True, the sales in question were not made pursuant to
a policy of price control by competition, but the scheme had
regulatory aspects. However, the discussion was on the plane
of the transaction of business by the province rather than of
police regulation, and a restriction of the decision to the latter
would seem to be contrary to its tone and spirit. True also
there is a much slighter substratum of experience and familiar-
102. A further argument that sec. 92(5) giving to the province "the
management and sale of the public lands belonging to the Province and of
the timber and wood thereon" by implication withdrew from the provinces
the power to make any other commodity sales was noticed and rejected.
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ity underlying provincial merchandising in Canada than sup-
ports municipal and state selling in the United States; but as
against this, the Dominion-provincial issue was clearly articu-
lated and definitely passed on in the Dominion, whereas with
us the analogous federal-state issue has been pretty much neg-
lected or avoided in the opinions.
Control by competition has by no means been an unused device
in the polity of the Australian states. Indeed so commonly has
it been resorted to at times past that an eminently qualified
authority could say in 1917 that "there are probably more ex-
amples of State industrial enterprise and competition in Aus-
tralia than elsewhere in the world."1 13  The New South Wales
government has been a fishmonger in Sydney and a baker in
the same city; Queensland has entered the butcher business in
Rockhampton and Brisbane, and Western Australia at various
urban centers within its borders; fish stalls have been operated
by the last-mentioned state at Perth and Fremantle; and with
such other miscellaneous ventures as the New South Wales and
Western Australian brickworks, sawmills in a number of states,
and machine and implement manufacturing, the states have en-
tered the field as competitors to correct price conditions which
were felt to be detrimental to the public welfare. Curiously
enough, however, in not a single instance does any constitutional
objection to such activity appear to have been urged. Partly,
no doubt, this traces to the absence of a due process clause in
the Australian Constitution; partly perhaps to the residual
powers of the Australian states0 4 which dispense with the need
of finding for them that grant of authority in more or less
express terms which is essential to the validity of Canadian
provincial legislation. Still, section 92 with its sweeping declara-
tion of absolute freedom of trade and commerce 05 remains; and
one is left to wonder why it has never been invoked against
this form of price control.
While there has been no adjudication on the states' power to
103. Wilkinson, State Regulation of Prices in Australia (1917) 155. The
materials with reference to state competition in Australia for this entire
paragraph are drawn from Chapter XI of Wilkinson, pp. 154-197, in which
he treats of "Regulating Prices by State Competition." See also Chapter
XIV, "State Purchase and Distribution of Supply in the Interest of Con-
sumers," pp. 213-224.
104. Supra, note 4.
105. Supra, note 14.
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sell commodities to the public in Australia, however, it is there
one must turn for the most direct pronouncements on the power
of the federal government in that regard. The Commonwealth
did not enter into the merchandising business (except in the
Northern Territory where it had some trading ventures) until
after the states had had considerable experience in the field and
as late as 1917 took no part in the competitive distribution of
commodities; but it did at that time have munitions, clothing,
and arms factories established which, while producing solely for
the government departments, were, of course, capable of pro-
ducing for general sales purposes should the Commonwealth
choose to embark on such a course. 06
It does not appear that the Commonwealth, in bidding on six
turbo-alternator sets for the Sydney municipal electric light
plant at Botany Bay and obtaining the contract for their supply
and installation, was consciously engaging in any such aggres-
sive policy of turning its existing facilities to competition with
private dealers in electrical supplies and equipment. Rather, it
seems, the extensive shops and plant of the Commonwealth
Shipping Board at Cockatoo and Schnapper Islands could not
be kept decently busy by the rather slight requirements of the
Australian naval and military defense services in a period of
deep peace. It was even asserted that they could not be kept
in a proper state of efficiency unless permitted to remain con-
tinuously operating, which would require that to some extent
the Shipping Board seek outside business from private persons.
Nevertheless, the High Court held, there was no power in the
federal government to enter on such a course of conduct, and
the city of Sydney must seek its turbo-alternators in some other
quarter 6 7 The trade and commerce power, it was held, gave
the Commonwealth no authority to engage in, but merely to
regulate, trade and commerce.
The real reliance of the Shipping Board, however, was on the
naval and defense power; for, it was urged, the dockyards and
workshops could not be maintained efficiently as a practical
matter without permitting their use in private enterprise when
naval construction was slack. To reject this plea, the . High
106. Wilkinson, op. cit. supra, note 103, at pp. 194, 195.
107. Commonwealth v. Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board (1926)
39 C. L. R. 1.
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Court intimated, hurt it more than it did the Shipping Board,
yet rejected it must be.1°8 "There is no power," it was said,
"which enables the Parliament or the Executive Government
to set up manufacturing or engineering business for general
commercial purposes,"'10 and this negation of authority was felt
to dispose of the Shipping Board's power to furnish and install
electrical materials although the case involved no attempt to set
up any business for any purpose but merely an effort to utilize
the surplus capacity of an existing plant established for a pur-
pose admittedly within the control of the Commonwealth.
This distinction thus casually brushed aside in the Shipping
Board Case came into its own nine years later in Attorney
General for Victoria ex rel. Victorian Chamber of Manufactures
v. The Commonwealth.'1 The Commonwealth, acting again un-
der the defense power, had maintained a clothing factory at
Melbourne for the purpose of making uniforms for the naval
and military forces and other services of the Commonwealth,
having found at the time of the war a disturbing discrepancy
between the amount for which it could make uniforms and the
amount at which it could buy them."' Finding that its skilled
employees could not be constantly occupied in satisfying its own
limited needs, it entered into the business of buying and selling
a great variety of clothing, mostly uniforms, to outside persons
and organizations in many different categories. 1 2 To stop such
108. "Despite the practical difficulties facing the Commonwealth in the
maintenance of its dockyards and works, the power of naval and military
defence does not warrant these activities in the ordinary conditions of peace,
whatever be the position in time of war or in conditions arising out of or
connected with war." Id., per Knox, C. J. and Gavan Duffy, Starke, and
Rich, JJ.
109. Id. per Knox, C. J. and Gavan Duffy, Starke, and Rich, JJ.
110. (1935) 52 C. L. R. 533.
111. In the statement of agreed facts submitted to the court appears
the following at p. 538: "At the outbreak of war the contract prices for
soldiers' jackets purchased from the trade ranged up to 25s. each. As the
result of information and experience gained from the operations at the
clothing factory, the price was fixed at 19s. per garment for all such
jackets purchased from the trade. Actually the price paid by the Defence
department to the clothing factory for such jackets was 18s. and 3d. per
jacket, and this price included an allowance of a per cent. for profit. A
similar position existed in relation to all other military garments during
the time of the war."
112. Something of the range and extent of the clothing factory's trading
activities is disclosed by the following classes of customers (additional to
Commonwealth forces and services) listed in the statement of facts: "(c)
Government departments and services of the state of Victoria to which
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dealings, the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures instituted pro-
ceedings against the Commonwealth, "no doubt," as Mr. Justice
Rich surmised, "out of a desire to suppress the competition of
the factory, such as it is."" 3 In this understandable aim the
Chamber was unsuccessful; Australia was authorized to go right
ahead continuing the competition such as it was.
The trading operations of the clothing factory were char-
acterized as mere incidents to its main business, that of supply-
ing uniforms for the Commonwealth forces and services; and,
held the court, the supplying of merchandise by the Common-
wealth in competition with private dealers insofar as it was
merely incidental to the conduct of an enterprise which it was
duly authorized to run was constitutionally unobjectionable. 114
As for the Shipping Board Case, the court cautiously avoided
a too extensive probe of its doctrines. There was no explicit
clothing has been supplied:-Victorian railways, penal establishments, Vic-
torian police, hospitals for insane, children's welfare department, aborigines
department, agricultural department, state dental centre, Victorian health
department, veterinary research department. (d) Other public and semi-
public bodies of the state of Victoria and other institutions and bodies to
which clothing has been supplied :-Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways
Board, Melbourne City Council, Ballard and Bendigo Tramways Board,
Metropolitan Fire Brigade, state electricity commission. (e) Other insti-
tutions and bodies and persons including the following:-Melbourne Aqua-
rium, Zoological Gardens, Boy Scouts Association, Sea Cadets Corps, Vic-
torian Civil Ambulance, St. John Ambulance Association, Lost Dogs' Home,
Royal Automobile Club of Victoria, Commonwealth Oil Refineries. In addi-
tion there have been a very few purchases by individual persons." Cf. with
this the sale of six turbo-alternators to the Sydney electric plant which,
so far as appears from the opinion, is the only transaction which had been
entered into by the Shipping Board, in Commonwealth v. Commonwealth
Shipping Board (1926) 39 C. L. R. 1.
113. (1935) 52 C. L. R. 533.
114. "This brings us to the question whether the legislative power in
respect of defence is a sufficient warrant for the legislation. . . . It is
obvious that the maintenance of a factory to make naval and military
equipment is within the field of legislative power. The method of its in-
ternal organization in time of peace is largely a matter for determination
by those to whom is entrusted the sole responsibility for the conduct of
naval and military defence. In particular, the retention of all members
of a specially trained and specially efficient staff might well be considered
necessary, and it might well be thought that the policy involved in such
retention could not be effectively carried out unless that staff was fully
engaged. Consequently, the sales of clothing, to bodies outside the regular
naval and military forces, are not to be regarded as the main or essential
purpose of this part of the business, but as incidents in the maintenance
for war purposes of an essential part of the munitions branch of the de-
fence arm. In such a matter much must be left to the direction of the
Governor General and the responsible ministers." 52 C. L. R. 533, 559, per
Gavan Duffy, C. J., and Evatt and MeTiernan, JJ.
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overruling; instead minute differences in the basic legislation
and petty variations in the facts were eagerly seized on to
support small-scale distinctions. In effect the earlier case was
dishonored though not disowned.
The retail sale of goods by the federal government seems to
be a form of activity which has never been undertaken as a
matter of regular governmental policy in either Canada or the
United States. It may, however, be worth while at this point
to call attention to the T.V.A. Case,115 for, while it was concerned
with the sale of electric current and so did not involve such a
transfer of commodities as concerns us here, the marked sim-
ilarity of its conclusions to those of the Australian Uniforms
Case should not be overlooked. The commerce power, with its
included control over navigable waters, and the defense power
were the heads of authority under which the establishment of
the plant was found to be within the constitutional competence
of the United States. With such authority to set it up, power
existed to run it in the manner usual and appropriate for the
efficient maintenance and operation of such establishments, and,
by virtue of Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution,-6 to sell
whatever surplus was created in doing so. The result is a recog-
nition that the federal government may produce and dispose of
articles of commerce in competition with private industry in so
far as its action is incidental to the efficient effectuation of some
one or more of its granted powers, such as the power of defense
-the very proposition which was sustained in Attorney General
for Victoria v. The Commonwealth.17
In many respects this all seems remote from price control
by competition. Certainly if the federal government can only
put on the market such occasional supplies as result incidentally
from the exercise of some specifically granted power, it cannot
proceed upon any very thoroughgoing trading scheme nor fig-
ure in the capacity of seller except in random accidental cases.
It should be remembered, however, that "incidental" is a catch-
115. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1935) 297 U. S. 288,
56 S. Ct. 466, 80 L. ed. 688.
116. "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging
to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed
as to prejudice any claim of the United States or of any particular State."
117. (1935) 52 C. L. R. 523.
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all concept under which almost anything can be included. If
the legislature or the executive does not use it as a subterfuge
and if the courts require a reasonably direct and demonstrable
relation between the selling involved in any given case and the
direct granted power to which it is referred, then it does seem
that the concept is not capable of supporting a policy of federal
price control by competition. Mr. Justice McReynolds, with un-
compromising legal realism, adverted in the T.V.A. Case to the
common rumor that the project was designed as a "yardstick" of
prevailing prices"-11 a stick which in this connection was quite
as useable for beating down as for mensuration; and the hetero-
geneous character of the purchasers of Commonwealth-made
clothing, ranging from poundkeepers to filling-station attend-
ants,"19 suggests that perhaps Mr. Justice Rich's guess that the
Australian merchants objected to government competition "such
as it is," and that their apprehension was not without factual
basis, were equally well-grounded. Quite likely the form of
words employed in both the Australian and the American de-
cisions could be found by a sympathetic court sufficiently broad
to authorize an almost indefinite extension of federal selling as
a means of influencing prices. How far the elastic term "inci-
dental" will be stretched as a matter of grubby fact is an un-
answered question. If it does not open, it certainly unlocks, the
door to federal action of the character indicated.
In guessing what the situation is in Canada, this Australian
and American history is of no help. It centered not upon fed-
eralism per se as a limiting force but upon the particular form
of federalism prevailing in the Commonwealth and the United
States, in which the general government is one of limited and
enumerated powers, with the residue of action reserved to the
states. 12 The need was to find an express grant of authority
which would permit of federal action, not to escape from pos-
118. "The record leaves no room for reasonable doubt that the primary
purpose was to put the Federal Government into the business of distribut-
ing and selling electric power throughout certain large districts, to expel
the power companies which had long serviced them, and to control the
market therein. A government instrumentality had entered upon a preten-
tious scheme to provide a 'yardstick' of the fairness of rates charged by
private owners and to attain 'no less a goal than the electrification of
America.'" Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1935) 297 U. S.
288, 361, 56 S. Ct. 466, 489, 80 L. ed. 688.
119. See supra, note 112.
120. Supra, notes 3, 4.
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sible qualifications of power which might prevent it. In a sys-
tem such as that of Canada, which proceeds on a different theory,
of substantially complete allocation of all possible realms of ac-
tion, with federal control over matters inadvertently unprovided
for,12' the stress is quite different.
The authority of the Dominion to act as merchant has been
adverted to in but one decision, that of Attorney General for
Canada v. Alexander Broum Milling and Elevator Company,122
involving the validity of the establishment and operations of
the Canadian Wheat Board. Strictly speaking the matter was
not at issue in that case, which went off upon grounds of estoppel
precluding one who had dealt with the board from thereafter
contesting its authority in certain respects. However, the dis-
cussion supporting the decision subsumed the capacity of the
Dominion government, acting through instrumentalities estab-
lished by it for that purpose, to buy and sell commodities. No
specific language in the British North America Act was adduced
as establishing a grant of the power. Instead Justice Rose spoke
of it as "within the general jurisdiction conferred by section
91, ''123 thus apparently identifying it as one of those powers of
indeterminate number and character embraced within the legis-
lative control over matters affecting the "peace, order, and good
government" of Canada, which are bestowed upon the Dominion.
There was no indication from the facts of the case or from the
discussion that the buying and selling functions of the Wheat
Board had been conferred, or had ever been exercised, for the
purpose of affecting internal price arrangements within Canada.
Rather what was apparently intended was a licensing system by
which the Dominion might supervise export arrangements at a
period when international commerce and credits were badly dis-
organized. Whether the establishment of a deliberately regula-
tive marketing scheme to affect prices would have been equally
acceptable, one cannot say, of course. Still, it should be noted
that the members of the court went out of their way to assert
that the power was not dependent on the existence of emergency
but would exist in equal vigor in times of the flattest normalcy.
At least where nothing but kind words were called for, the
121. Supra, notes 7, 8.
122. (Ont. App.) [1923] 4 D. L. R. 443.
123. Id. at 451.
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Ontario court showed itself most generous in its attitude toward
Dominion trading.
Not the least interesting feature of the case was that it voiced
its approval not only of Dominion selling but of Dominion buy-
ing as well, thereupon touching upon a phase of government
activity seldom mentioned in the reports. Inadequate as is the
body of materials on the subject of the constitutionality of gov-
ernment selling to break a price, it is inexhaustibly rich com-
pared with that involving governmental buying to make a price.
The reasons for this are not particularly obscure. The case
system of law making postulates action to complain of and a
person who may complain. For want of these, competitive con-
trol of prices in the interest of sellers by a program of govern-
ment buying is pretty much unexplored territory.
Sporadic efforts in this direction have occasionally appeared.
In Australia, for instance, Tasmanian metal purchases and
Victorian lumber acquisitions served the purpose contemplated
of keeping mines and mills in operation during the early days
of the war, until the shrunken private demand could expand to
its normal dimensions. 22 More extensive and more recent pro-
grams of the same general nature have been incidental to the
recovery activities of the last few years in the United States,
where purchases by the Federal Surplus Commodities Corpora-
tions and like agencies, particularly of foodstuffs, have served
the double purpose of securing supplies for distribution to urban
reliefers and of raising the depressed prices of various commodi-
ties for the benefit of destitute rural producers.12G Such in-
124. Wilkinson, op. cit. supra, note 103.
125. The Federal Surplus Relief Corporation was organized as a Dela-
ware corporation on October 4, 1933, primarily as a relief agency; on
November 18, 1935, the charter was amended, the name being changed to
the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation and the emphasis placed on
removal of agricultural surpluses rather than general relief purposes. Re-
port of Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation for 1935, p. 1. "The
transfer of the direction of the Corporation from the Federal Emergency
Relief Administration to the Department of Agriculture involved a shift
of emphasis from the relief to the agricultural aspects of the functions of
the Corporation * * * The controlling factor in the determination of policies
became the removal of agricultural surpluses and the encouragement of
domestic consumption rather than providing for the needs of the unem-
ployed. At the outset the Corporation became the principal agency of the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration for the disposition of surplus agri-
cultural commodities procured by the Agricultural Adjustment Administra-
tion with a view to increasing returns to the producers, to preventing waste,
and to developing domestic consumption through the diversion of the sur-
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stances are exceptional. That no more widespread use has been
made of buying as a price-raising instrumentality by govern-
ments federal, state, or provincial, is attributable perhaps to the
fact that the exertions in recent years toward control by com-
mand have largely absorbed the attention of legislators. Even
the little that has been done has been allowed to pass unchal-
lenged.
The nature of the considerations which have produced this
strange failure to attack them is perforce conjectural, but some
explanations may be hazarded. There is, for one thing, the
circumstance that the distributing middlemen, who in the first
instance bear the brunt of the enhanced prices, are to a con-
siderable extent enabled to shift them on down the line until the
added cost per unit to each individual consumer is so impercepti-
ble as not to arouse the impulse to sue. Thus psychology (or
economics) renders it unlikely that anyone will sue. Law then
does its share to discourage litigation by making it improbable
pluses from the normal channels of trade and commerce." Id. at pp. 1, 2.
Initially procurement was in three ways, first, "direct purchase under com-
petitive conditions with the Corporation's own funds"; second, "donation
by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration" which had "purchased
various price-depressing surpluses"; third, "donation by the several State
Emergency Relief Administrations" acquiring particular commodities of
which there existed "a highly localized surplus * * * which was seriously
depressing the price for that commodity." Id. at pp. 2, 3. Later, the main
reliance has been on direct purchase in various manners, e. g., by purchas-
ing "butter and eggs on the produce exchanges, * * * grapefruit and other
fruits and vegetables at country shipping points, f. o. b. cars, * * * certain
miscellaneous products, such as sugarcane sirup, directly from producers,
* ** (and) dry skim milk and cheese * * * on the basis of competitive bids
submitted in accordance with the usual governmental practise." Report of
Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation for 1936, p. 2. The great bulk
of the acquisitions has consisted of agricultural produce (especially food-
stuffs, although cotton, cotton ticking, flax, hides and skins, wool, etc. have
also been handled in considerable quantity). By Public Law No. 18 of the
Seventy-Fifth Congress, the Corporation was also authorized to deal, and
has accordingly dealt, in surplus fish and fish products. Report of Federal
Surplus Commodities Corporation for 1937, p. 2. The principal channel for
distribution has been via the various state and local relief agencies (see
table of distribution by states and commodities, Report for 1936, pp. 11-16)
supplemented by sales, e. g., of seed grain to farmers at cost (Report for
1937, p. 2) and of hides and skins in small quantities on the open market
(id., p. 3). Some notion of the extent of the Corporation's operations may
perhaps be given by a few representative figures; thus, in fiscal 1937, its
commodity disbursements amounted to $684,043; during that year it handled
in excess of 12,349,000 pounds of fish, 287,000 cases of eggs, 1,300,000
pounds of dried beans, to mention but three out of forty-four classes of
commodities dealt in (id. pp. 5-8). Its existence was continued by Pub.
Law No. 165 of the Seventy-Fifth Congress, approved June 28, 1937, until
June 30, 1939 (id. p. 3).
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that anyone can sue. By limiting the right to attack legislation
to those whose interests are adversely affected in some direct
and appreciable way, 2 6 constitutional law on its procedural side
practically refuses to hear any attack on the availability of
government buying as a competitive weapon. Who can show the
requisite interest? the consumers? the taxpayer? The injury is
so remote and speculative, the claim to obtain goods at a price
set by the competition of all the private members of society
severally without also having to meet the whole public acting
jointly as a competitor so tenuous, the relation of the govern-
ment's action to any given transaction so indefinable, that the
courts may well question whether, absent very special circum-
stances, anyone is entitled to call the legitimacy of such a system
into question.
Whatever the cause, there is a startling poverty of case au-
thority. Aside from the benedictional dictum in Attorney Gen-
eral for Canada v. Alexander Brown Milling and Elevator Co., 1 7
the totality of judicial wisdom on the constitutional power of
government to engage in the buying of commodities21 seems to
be embraced in the decisions on the North Dakota enactments
involved in Green v. Frazier,"2 already mentioned in discussing
a state's authority to enter the market as a competing seller.
North Dakota had, by constitutional amendments and implement-
ing statutes, adopted a program of buying, selling, and other-
wise dealing in grain and other agricultural products of the
state, and of acquiring elevators and mills to put the program
into effect. The suit, in the form of a taxpayer's proceeding to
enjoin the issuance of bonds and the disbursement of funds for
such plants and structures, asserted that the scheme was in
contravention of the due process provisions of the Federal Con-
stitution in that the purpose of the statute was not a public
126. See Note (1938) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 897 on the standing to protest
against federal expenditures.
127. (Ont. App.) [1923] 4 D. L. R. 443.
128. In Howard v. New York City (1923) 236 N. Y. 91, 140 N. E. 206,
a contract to buy fish to supply inhabitants of the city, entered into by
virtue of a wartime statute of New York authorizing cities under certain
conditions to buy food and fuel to supply the inhabitants, was held invalid
because of non-compliance with provisions of the New York City charter
as to the manner in which contracts of purchase by the city should be
made. No constitutional point respecting the power to authorize municipal
buying for public purposes was raised or mentioned.
129. (1920) 44 N. D. 395, 176 N. W. 11.
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purpose, and hence taxation to effectuate it transgressed the
Fourteenth Amendment. In rapid succession, the Federal Dis-
trict Court for North Dakota 30 and the state supreme court' 31
disallowed the contention of unconstitutionality, and the decision
of the latter was affirmed upon appeal by the United States
Supreme Court.132
While the statute embraced in its terms both buying and sell-
ing, and the state court did casually notice the matter of sell-
ing, 1 33 the burden of the discussion in all three courts dwelt on
the importance of agriculture in the economy of North Dakota
and the need for a parity of bargaining position on the part of
the seller-producer if the state were to prosper. The selling
activities of the state under the act were secondary and in-
cidental. 3 Essentially the program was heavy artillery in sup-
port of the embattled farmer. The discussion of background
factors was comparatively thorough, not to say impassioned, in
the opinion of the district court and the state supreme court' 35
and relatively sketchy in that of the United States Supreme
Court, which evinced in large measure a willingness to accept
the conclusions of the state court as to needs and conditions in
the state, which were the governing considerations in establish-
130. Scott v. Frazier (D. C. N. D. 1919) 258 Fed. 669.
131. Green v. Frazier (1920) 44 N. D. 395, 176 N. W. 11.
132. Green v. Frazier (1920) 253 U. S. 233, 40 S. Ct. 499, 64 L. ed. 878.
133. See Green v. Frazier (1920) 44 N. D. 395, 176 N. W. 11: "All
the grain raised in this state must be, and is, considered a prime necessity.
It is needed and must be had to sustain the very life of the people, and
without it the people would starve, as they would freeze if they had no
fuel."
134. It does not appear very clearly that in actual operation either ob-jective has been pursued consistently enough to raise materially the price
paid to the North Dakota farmer or lower that paid by the North Dakota
consumer, although this may be due in either or both cases to the con-
struction of the plant in a period of high cost; see Cooke, The North Dakota
State Mill and Elevator (1938) 46 J. Pol. Econ. 23.
135. "It is hopeless to expect a population consisting of farmers scat-
tered over a vast territory as the people of this state are to create any
private business system that will change the system now existing. The
only means through which the people of the state have had any experience
in joint action is their state government. If they may not use that as a
common agency through which to combine their capital and carry on such
basic industries as elevators, mills, and packing houses, and so fit their
products for market and market the same, they must continue to deal as
individuals with injustices that always exist where economic units so differ-
ent in power, have to deal the one with the other." Scott v. Frazier (D. C.
N. D. 1919) 258 Fed. 669, 680; and see the recital in Green v. Frazier
(1920) 44 N. D. 395, 415, 176 N. W. 11, of the importance of agriculture
in the life of the state.
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ing the public purpose of the taxation, and so its conformity to
the due process requirement. The federal district court and the
United States Supreme Court confined their constitutional ob-
servations to the proposition that the scheme did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The state court went beyond this to declare that the program
was not opposed to any provision of the Federal Constitution-
without express mention of anything other than the Fourteenth
Amendment, however. Curiously there is a clear enough recog-
nition in the course of the discussion in both the district court
and the state opinions that the intended result of the statute
was to strike at extrastate dealers and so to interfere with the
accustomed movement of the grain in interstate commerce at
their expense for the benefit of the local growers ;130 but, plainly
as the fact was spelled out, there is not a syllable as to any
possible inconsistency between the grain-buying program and
the commerce clause. The blanket language of the state decision
is the only statement conceivably applying to this phase of the
case and, if even it does, the court is careful to keep the secret
to itself. Possibly the matter was regarded as one of those mea-
sures of state police power which incidentally affect without
directly regulating interstate commerce, sed quaere.'8 7
136. "The people have thus come to believe that the evils of the existing
system consist, not merely in the grading of grain, its weighing, its dock-
age, the price paid and the disparity between the price of different grades
and the flour-producing capacity of the grain. They believe that the evil
goes deeper; that the whole system of shipping the raw material of North
Dakota to these foreign terminals is wasteful and hostile to the best inter-
ests of the state." Scott v. Frazier (D. C. N. D. 1919) 258 Fed. 669,
679. "These vast losses sustained by the farmer are reaped as rewards by
the great elevators and milling interests, commission firms, chambers of
commerce, located in Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth, or other cities out-
side the state. Into their hands they have passed, as profits, never to return
to the farmers or business interests of the state of North Dakota. To
prevent these losses, to retain in the state of North Dakota, in the future,
these lost profits, to pay the farmer the full value of the product of the
soil produced by him, and by thus so doing to secure the prosperity of every
business and of every inhabitant of the state, the Constitution has been
amended, laws enacted, and bonds, by the legislature, authorized and is-
sued; for the purpose of affording the producers of grain within this state
a market where they will receive the full value of their products." Green v.
Frazier (1920) 44 N. D. 395, 417, 418, 176 N. W. 11.
137. The reader will also find the case of Albritton v. Winona (Miss.
1938) 178 So. 799 of interest. It involved the validity of a proposed bond
issue for the construction of a hosiery and wearing apparel factory to be
leased to private industry, pursuant to the terms of Miss. Laws 1936, 1st
ex. sess., ch. 1, purporting to authorize municipalities to issue bonds to
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The past and the present of price control by competition have
been examined. What may we say of the future? In most of
its phases, it is true, our only knowledge is that afforded by al-
most complete ignorance; but certainly control by competition
has found the courts in a much more receptive mood than has
control by command. 138
As to federal competitive buying, the cases are completely
blank, except for a vague Canadian dictum. In state or pro-
vincial competitive buying, there are only the sparse materials
of the North Dakota elevator cases, but they sustained such
action without sugarcoating its competitive character and, what
further strengthens their force, the legislation involved was de-
liberately calculated to disturb firmly established practises in
interstate commerce and to govern the conduct of competing
buyers located in another state.
The government as a competing seller has received more at-
tention, both legislative and judicial, although there is not a
great deal larger body of developed doctrine on the federal issues
involved. Starting in such unrelated doctrines as those relating
to control of intoxicating liquors and those with reference to
public utilities, the law of state selling has more and more out-
grown these garments of infancy. There has been a continual
expansion of judicial lenience toward such activity. While the
law is pretty much higgledy-piggledy as to why and where and
when and how far states or provinces may control prices by
competing for buyers with individual sellers, the significant
thing is that they are becoming accustomed to engaging in this
sort of activity and the courts to sustaining it. Probably in all
attract outside industry to the state and also to operate manufacturing
plants themselves if such action were approved by the state. The court,
in holding the statute valid, relied heavily on Green v. Frazier. The main
support for the act was found in the fact that it was a measure to relieve
unemployment but the court also indicated that another disclosed objective
of the act, that of promoting agriculture by introducing or operating indus-
trial projects, was an additional reason for holding the act constitutional,
reciting that the natural resources and agricultural products of the state
are being carried beyond its borders for processing to the detriment of the
citizens. Attention is especially called to the following passage, from p.
804: "The specific question here is the validity vel non of the lease provi-
sion of the statute, but, if the Legislature cannot constitutionally permit
municipalities to own and operate industrial plants for the accomplishment
of the intended purposes, it cannot, of course, accomplish such purposes by
permitting them to acquire and lease such plants for operation by private
persons and corporations."
138. Supra, note 21.
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three federations the power of state or province so to act will
be recognized against whatever objections may be urged. What
rationale will be improvised for the purpose is not yet clear nor
does it seem profoundly important.
The most restricted area of control by competition appears
to be that of federal competitive selling. There the emerging
doctrine is, in Australia and the United States, that there must
be some ascertainable granted power to which the selling may
be said to be incidental. Any estimate of how much of a curb
the qualification is must await further development of just what
the legislatures are going to "attempt, and the courts to swallow,
as incidental exercise of power. Probably there will be no over-
plus of consistency in the application of the doctrine. In Canada,
whose Dominion government is constituted on a different basis,
there is an apparent willingness to recognize the federal right
to engage in selling without demanding that any explicit grant
of power be found fo support such action. Perhaps the best way
in- which the federal governments of Australia and the United
States can act to promote such programs is to make loans or
grants in aid to the states to assist in the financing of such as
seem to call for that treatment.
The difference between the prospects for control by command
and control by competition are striking. The former, whether
in aid of buyers or of sellers, is at present a bruised and battered
procedure, which has seldom been approved in theory and never
in such form as to become effective in the face of objections
based on the federal system and especially on interference with
interstate or interprovincial trade and commerce. Control by
competition, on the other hand, is now everywhere a successful
thriving device, against which the argument of "interstate com-
merce" has never been employed successfully and seldom has
even been mentioned. Failing the discovery of the undiscover-
able line between interstate and intrastate commerce, to which
the general and the constituent governments may advance there
to join without touching, it begins to look as though, under the
federal systems of the United States, Canada, and Australia,
the only available method of price regulation is control by com-
petition. In the great Anglo-American federal commonwealths,
unconstitutionality of business regulation may yet drive the gov-
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ernments to business operation as the only effective and con-
stitutional way of controlling price relations. 39
139. See Keezer and May (1930) The Public Control of Business, espe-
cially at pp. 195, 196, 238-240, stating practically the same conclusion,
arrived at after a consideration of somewhat different issues and difficulties
and confined to the situation in the United States. Cf. the question posed
as a result of a review of the ineffectiveness of anti-trust regulations, Jack-
son and Dumbauld, Monopolies and the Courts (1938) 86 U. Pa. L. Rev.
231 at 256, 257 ("And should the technique of legalistic regulation, now
familiar in the field of public utility law, be buttressed by the indirect, but
perhaps more effective use, of economic weapons, such as the creation of
government competition in the form of 'yardstick' enterprises or the sub-
sidizing of competition, where other methods do not avail?").
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